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THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVE OF
REALITY IN PUBLIC SCHOOL CURRICULA:
UNTRUTHS ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY AS A
VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
INTRODUCTION
American public schools1 instruct our nation's youth in
reading, writing and arithmetic, and, inevitably, in the values
and perspectives that shape each school's curriculum.' Be-
cause of the role schools play in teaching students, controver-
sial topics in society often become mirrored in debates about
what schools should teach.' This is particularly true regarding
topics that relate to sexuality.4 Thus, as gay men and lesbians
1 For the purposes of this Note, the term "public schools" refers to both ele-
mentary and secondary schools that are operated by a government entity, typically
a local school board.
2 Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 879 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(public schools "inevitably . . . inculcate ways of thought and outlooks"). Some
state legislatures have drafted "core value curricula" in an effort to directly define
the values taught in their schools. See Tracy M. Lorenz, Value Training: Educa-
tion or Indoctrination? A Constitutional Analysis, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 593, 594-95
(1992) (discussing potential constitutional challenges to implementation of Arizona's
core values curriculum based on the First Amendment's protection of the right to
form one's own beliefs and opinions and concluding that "the most effective curric-
ulum [and the program most likely to survive constitutional attack] is one that
fosters decision-making skills").
' For example, the cold war mentality was reflected in Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (invalidating statute that required public university
professors to sign a loyalty pledge). Public divide over the United States' involve-
ment in Vietnam set the context for Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (striking down school's prohibition on black armbands
worn to express disagreement with the American presence in Vietnam). Presently,
communities are debating the proper scope of AIDS-education curricula. See, e.g.,
Board of Educ. v. Sobol, 161 Misc. 2d 393, 613 N.Y.S.2d 792 (Sup. Ct. Albany
County 1993) (upholding decision of New York State's Board of Regents, which
struck down resolution that required New York City public schools to emphasize
abstinence in all AIDS-education instruction).
" As the Ninth Circuit expressed, "few things are so significant to our society,
or reflect such deeply held and widely divergent views crying out for expression,
as ... sex education." Planned Parenthood v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d
817, 819 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding exclusion of advertisements relating to family
planning in school publications because ban preserved schoors neutrality).
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have gained greater visibility in society and politics during the
last few decades, debate over the presentation of, or the silence
about, homosexuality in the public schools not surprisingly has
increased. Although many adults have come to view homosexu-
ality as an important topic for schools to address accurately,5
others advocate that teachers explicitly condemn the "gay life-
style."6 Similarly, the reality of AIDS in the lives of many chil-
dren and teenagers has contributed to the re-assessment of
curricula on topics such as sexuality, family composition and
discrimination.!
Moreover, widening enactment of minimal legal
protections against discrimination, as well as other signs of
public recognition that gay people face unfair prejudice, recent-
ly have been the catalyst for virulent anti-gay initiative cam-
paigns.' The powerful 1990s backlash against non-discrimina-
A few school systems have adopted curricula designed to teach about gay
men and lesbians in a fact-based, respectful way. Fairfax County, Virginia,
Broward County, Florida, Houston, Texas, and San Francisco, California now dis-
cuss lesbian and gay parents along with other families starting in the middle
grades. William Cells 3d, Schools Across U.S. Cautiously Adding Lessons on Gay
Life, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 6, 1993, at A19; see also Don Aucoin, Weld Is Set to Sign
Gay Student Rights Bill; Advocates Hail First-in-Nation Legislation, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 10, 1993, at 37 (discussing Massachusetts bill that outlaws discrimi-
nation against gay and lesbian students in public schools); Chris Bull, Safety Net:
The Massachusetts State Board of Education Moves to Make High Schools Safe for
Gay and Lesbian Youth, ADVOCATE, Sept. 7, 1993, 52, 52-53 (reporting that Mas-
sachusetts is implementing broad state-wide support systems for gay and lesbian
youth primarily in response to high abuse rate of gay youth).
In addition, New York City has a small public high school for gay students
forced out of mainstream schools by anti-gay violence and Los Angeles, Minneapo-
lis-St. Paul, and Seattle have special counseling or AIDS-education programs for
gay teens that operate in the schools. Gary Putka, Uncharted Course: Efforts to
Teach Teens About Homosexuality Advances in Schools, WALL ST. J., June 12,
1990, at Al (noting that although there are few services tailored to gay and lesbi-
an youth, some parents nonetheless see these as unfair, special rights serving only
"'a very small segment of the population'").
'Kevin Cranston, Director of the liV/AIDS program for the Massachusetts
Department of Health, has observed that "[w]ith more and more gay and lesbian
students coming out, it's been very hard for school districts to completely deny
their existence." Bull, supra note 5, at 52.
' By 1990, 33 states and 80% of large school districts required AIDS preven-
tion education. See Putka, supra note 5, at Al; see also Mary B. Tabor, For Gay
High-School Seniors, Nightmare Is Almost Over, N.Y. TnIES, June 14, 1992, at 41
("[s]chools across the country are revisiting curriculums" in response to the AIDS
epidemic and anti-gay violence).
' In the past two decades, over 100 municipalities and eight states have
amended their civil rights laws to ban discrimination on the basis of sexual orien-
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tion protection for gay men and lesbians includes efforts to
remove or slant discussions of homosexuality in public educa-
tion.9 Ballot initiatives in many states and municipalities have
sought to forbid any legal protections or "special rights" based
on sexual orientation 0 and, in many instances, to impose re-
tation. Note, Constitutional Limits on Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 1905, 1923-25 (1993) (discussing legislation passed in the early 1970s and
subsequent repeal efforts).
This backlash phenomenon dates back to the 1970s when, after the lesbian
and gay community first attained civil rights protection in some municipalities, the
religious right organized campaigns to repeal the protective legislation and began
seeking to bar the issue of homosexuality from public school systems. Note, supra
note 8, at 1908. In 1977 and 1978, voters eliminated civil rights protections based
on sexual orientation in cities in Florida, Minnesota, Kansas and Oregon. Kristina
Campbell & Lyn Stoesen, 19 Years of Ballot Battles, WASH. BLADE, Nov. 12, 1993,
at 24; see also Note, supra note 8, at 1908.
In 1978, a California ballot referendum popularly known as the Briggs Initia-
tive sought to grant schools the right to fire any public school employee who en-
gaged in "advocating, soliciting, imposing, encouraging or promoting private or
public homosexual activity." See Nan D. Hunter, Speech, Identity and Equality, 79
VA. L. REV. 1695, 1703 (1993) (citing California Proposition 6, § 3(b)(2) (1978)).
The initiative was designed and understood as a referendum on whether the state
should fire gay teachers so as to remove them from any contact with children. Id.
Although the Briggs Initiative was defeated in California, Oklahoma legislators,
reacting to a campaign led by religious right crusader Anita Bryant, enacted its
language into law the following year. See National Gay Task Force v. Board of
Educ., 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984) (statutory provision that forbade "public ho-
mosexual conduct" defined as "advocating, soliciting, imposing, encouraging or pro-
moting" homosexuality, was struck down as overbroad because it punished protect-
ed, out-of-the-classroom speech), affd, 470 U.S. 903 (1985) (per curiam).
10 In the 1993 elections, for example, voters in Cincinnati, Ohio endorsed mea-
sures to rescind and ban anti-discrimination protections based on sexual orienta-
tion and, in the case of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, to bar any type of "protect-
ed" status for gay men and lesbians. The 1993 Elections: Propositions, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 3, 1993, at A24. But see Equality Found. v. Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417
(S.D. Ohio 1994) (permanently enjoining implementation and enforcement of the
initiative amendment to that city's charter). For the 1994 elections, groups in
"Florida, Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Oregon, Texas, and Washington ...
organiz[ed] efforts for such legislation in their states" Tamar Lewin, Sights Are
Set on Other Anti-Gay Measures, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1993, at A22. Idaho and
Oregon had the only statewide initiatives with enough support to appear on the
November 1994 ballot, but both initiatives were defeated at the polls. Robert Pear,
The 1994 Election: States Ballot Measures, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1994, at B7.
The most significant legal dispute to date has involved the Colorado anti-gay
ballot initiative known as Amendment 2. Approved by the Colorado electorate on
November 3, 1992, Amendment 2 revised the Colorado Constitution to prevent gay,
lesbian, or bisexual orientation from ever serving as the basis for a "claim [of]
minority status ... [or] claim of discrimination." COLO. CONST. art. 11, § 30b
(1992). The amendment, however, has since been struck down as a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause because it uniquely hampers the ability of those who be-
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strictions on any teaching or mention of homosexuality in pub-
lic schools."
In many parts of the country, such efforts to exclude a
positive view (or any view) of homosexuality from public school
curricula are just one aspect of a broader campaign to influ-
ence local school curricula on a number of related topics, in-
cluding sexual abstinence until marriage and abortion.12
These campaigns are organized and financed by national con-
servative and far-right religious organizations13 that employ
lieve in non-discrimination for lesbians and gay men to participate in the political
process. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994) (afrming permanent injunc-
tion), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1092 (1995).
" See, e.g., Oregon Ballot Measure 9 (1992). This measure sought to require
"the State Department of Higher Education and the public schools [to] assist in
setting a standard for Oregon's youth that recognizes homosexuality, pedophilia,
sadism and masochism as abnormal, wrong, unnatural, and perverse and that
these behaviors are to be discouraged and avoided." Although this state-wide mea-
sure was defeated in the November 1992 elections, anti-gay initiatives reflecting
this language continued to be filed in cities and counties across Oregon, which
were "targeted because a majority of voters in those communities supported" Mea-
sure 9 in the 1992 election. See ACLU, Anti-Lesbian/Gay Ballot Initiatives, DOCK-
ET, Jan. 1, 1994, at 9.
1 See, e.g., Mimi Hill, Debating How Far to Go on Sex Ed, USA TODAY, Oct.
7, 1993, at 12 (discussing nationwide debates on abstinence-based curricula that
teach that "abortion is not the right choice"); Connie Langland, Teachers Wince at
Board Plan Listing Taboos, PHIL. INQUIRER, June 6, 1993, at B1, B4 (writing that
a Pennsylvania school district's proposal to prohibit instruction on sexual behavior
outside the context of family values "reflects complaints .. . made by many con-
servative Christians, particularly Christians for Excellence in Education"); Seth
Mydans, Evangelicals Gain with CoveA Candidates, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1992, at
Al (reporting the agenda of the religious right in schools centering on teaching
abstinence and eliminating mention of abortion and homosexuality).
The extreme religious right
encompasses a number of conservative groups, primarily fundamentalist
or evangelical Protestant in orientation, that emerged in the 1970s and
"coalesced with the political right in 1979-80." Some of the most well-
known conservative groups that make up the [religious right] are Jerry
Falwell's Liberty Foundation, (formerly [the] Moral Majority), Phyllis
Schlafly's Eagle Forum . . . Tim LaHaye's American Coalition for Tradi-
tional Values, Beverly LaHaye's Concerned Women for America, and Mel
and Norma Gabler's Educational Research Analysts. Among other nation-
al groups are the National Christian Action Coalition, the Concerned
Coalition of Parents, the National Association of Christian Educators, and
Citizens for Excellence in Education.
Martha M. McCarthy, Secular Humanism and Education, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 467,
470 (1990) (footnote omitted).
In addition, the far religious right movement has spawned a number of na-
tional legal organizations dedicated to promoting and protecting its agenda. Such
organizations include the Rutherford Institute, Concerned Women for America's
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an array of carefully designed tactics to influence local school
boards. One common tactic is to ran "stealth" candidates-indi-
viduals who mask their religious affiliations and agenda until
elected-for school board seats. 4
As a result, school curricula have become a battleground
on which issues of homosexuality are debated. Some state
legislatures and local school boards already have adopted re-
strictions mandating that teachers stress that homosexuality is
unacceptable and unhealthy,15 or have banned the topic of
homosexuality altogether. 6 Several other localities and states
Education and Legal Defense Foundation, and the National Legal Foundation es-
tablished by Pat Robertson. See Keith Waldman, Appealing to a Higher Law: Con-
servative Christian Legal Action Groups Bring Suit to Challenge Public School
Curricula and Reading Materials, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 437, 439-40 (1987).
"' See, e.g., Note, supra note 8, at 1909 (noting that religious right groups "fre-
quently distort the true nature of their organizations, rely on discredited experts
and facts, and conceal from voters the true purpose of their legislation"); David
Hill, Christian Soldier, TEACHER MAG., Nov./Dec. 1992, at 18 (discussing grass-root
tactics by conservative Christians to infiltrate public school boards by concealing
religious agenda until after elections); Mydans, supra note 12, at A17 (same); Jill
Smolowe, Crusade for the Classroom, TIME, Nov. 1, 1993, at 34 (quoting Ralph
Reed, executive director of the Christian Coalition, who explained the strategy of
"fly[ing] under the radar of the media ... so they don't know what hit them until
it's too late"). One commentator has noted that the religious right's "greatest po-
tential to achieve political success is through the local school board." McCarthy,
supra note 13, at 488-89.
Is ALA. CODE § 16-40A-2 (Supp. 1992) (requiring emphasis in sexual education
instruction that "homosexuality is not a lifestyle acceptable to the general public
and that homosexual conduct is a criminal offense"); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-
716 (Supp. 1994) (prohibiting any information in AIDS-education curriculum that
"[p]romotes a homosexual lifestyle [or p]ortrays homosexuality as a positive alter-
native life-style"); TEY. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 163.002 (West 1992) (pro-
viding restrictions identical to Alabama statute cited supra); see also Memorandum
from Steve Mecham, Associate Superintendent, Utah State Office of Education, to
Members of the Utah State Board of Education 2 (Apr. 2, 1993) (stating that the
Utah State Textbook Commission had approved banning "[tihe advocacy of homo-
sexuality as a desirable or healthy sexual adjustment or lifestyle" throughout Utah
public school textbooks) [hereinafter Mecham Memorandum]. On June 15, 1993 the
Utah State Board of Education formally adopted this policy. Telephone Interview
with Shauna Stewart, Instructional Materials Specialist, Utah State Office of Edu-
cation (Apr. 20, 1995). For a further discussion of these statutes, see discussion
infra part IV.
" New York City School District 24 "has mandated that any reference to ...
homosexuality... be eliminated from the curriculum." Letter from Joseph F.
Quinn, Community Superintendent of Community School District 24, to All Parents
and Guardians of Children Enrolled in District 24 Schools (seeking parental per-
mission for students to participate in AIDS instruction for the 1991-92 school year)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Quinn Letter]; see also Steven L. Myers, Queens
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continue to consider similar policies.'7 A ballot initiative re-
cently rejected by voters in Idaho, for example, sought to re-
quire that "[n]o employee, representative, or agent of any pub-
lic elementary or secondary school shall, in connection with
school activities, promote, sanction, or endorse homosexuality
as a healthy, approved or acceptable behavior." "
The laws enacted to date and current proposals to limit
teaching about homosexuality fall into three categories. These
regulations either completely ban the topic of homosexuality,19
ban the view that homosexuality is acceptable," or require
teachers affirmatively to emphasize the view that homosexuali-
ty is unacceptable.2' Meanwhile, those schools that lack any
formal policy continue the longstanding practice of attempting
to ignore the existence of gay and lesbian people in their cur-
ricula.22 Such inaction not only produces many of the same
School Board Suspended in Fight on Gay-Life Curriculum, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2,
1992, at Al (reporting that "District 24 has steadfastly refused to accept any ref-
erences [to homosexuality] at all"); Liz Willen, Gay Life a Taboo Subject,
NEWSDAY, Apr. 23, 1992, at 3 (discussing resolution). See infra part IV.
17 A similar method of restricting discussions of homosexuality in public schools
recently appeared at the national level. See Katherine Q. Seelye, Senate Backs
Cuts for Schools that Endorse Homosexuality, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1994, at A16. In
1994, the United States Senate passed a bill that eliminated federal funds to any
school that "encouraged or supported homosexuality 'as a positive life style
alternative' or that distributed materials that did so or that referred a student 'to
an organization that affirms a homosexual life style'" Id. The effect of this mea-
sure was neutralized by a subsequent bill that suspended funding to schools that
encouraged any type of sexual activity. Id. Nonetheless, the initial measure indi-
cates growing political concern over these issues.
S Proposition One, Public Schools § 67-8004 (establishing state policies regard-
ing homosexuality); see also ICA Plans New Anti-Gay Initiative, IDAHO STATESMAN,
Apr. 20. 1995, 1B (Idaho Citizens Alliance planning similar initiatives for the
November 1996 ballot dealing with the treatment of homosexuality in the schools).
See infra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
II See infra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
The majority of American school districts do not include gay and lesbian
issues in their curricula and have no special counseling programs for gay youth.
SEX INFO. & EDUC. COUNCIL OF THE U.S., UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A SEICUS AS-
SESSMENT OF STATE SEXUALITY EDUCATION PROGRAMS 9 (1994) (study of 28 state
sex-education curricula found that the majority of states "do not fully address-or
omit entirely-such topics as sexual identity and orientation"); see also Patrick
Welsh, Gays in School: Fear and Isolation Leave Homosexual Kids in Hiding,
WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 1990, at Cl.
Solmitz v. Maine Sch. Admin., 495 A.2d 812 (Me. 1985), documents one school
district's reaction to the assault and drowning of a local gay man by three area
high school students. Id. at 815. When a teacher proposed "Tolerance Day" to
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harms that result from explicitly anti-gay policies,' but also
is more difficult to challenge constitutionally.
This Note argues that regulations and statutes designed to
impose an anti-gay slant to the entire curriculum of a public
school or to a particular course (such as a sex- or AIDS-educa-
tion class) impermissibly violate students' first amendment
right to receive information. Part I articulates the goals and
functions of public schools in the United States, including the
critical one of instilling democratic and constitutional values. It
specifically demonstrates the need for schools to provide accu-
rate and balanced information about sexual orientation to give
gay youth an equal and safe opportunity for a public education.
Accurate information about sexual orientation, in fact, benefits
all students by diminishing their fear of sexual differences and
exposing them to the complexity of the real world.
Part II then examines the general principles of first
amendment law that relate to curricula and to other speech in
the school context. Because the Supreme Court never has con-
sidered a first amendment right-to-receive-information chal-
lenge to a curriculum restriction, Part III draws on the prece-
dents discussed in Part II to explore such an approach. This
section proposes a balancing test involving six factors that
courts should employ when evaluating first amendment chal-
lenges to laws restricting the content of public school curricula.
Finally, Part IV describes in detail the anti-gay curriculum
restrictions enacted to date and concludes that these restric-
tions are unconstitutional under the proposed balancing test.
Although courts defer a great deal to local school officials
in the operation of public schools, local autonomy is not abso-
lute. Perpetuating prejudice and misinforming youth are not
appropriate goals for schools. As this nation learned in Brown
v. Board of Education24 and its aftermath, the Constitution
address the prejudices amongst students by inviting members of various minority
groups to speak at the school, the school balked at allowing a lesbian to be among
the included speakers. Id. After some parents expressed concern, the school offi-
cials canceled the entire event-a decision upheld by the court. Id. at 816. Allow-
ing something of a heckler's veto, the court found that the school's decision was
justified because 'Tolerance Day" was potentially disruptive. Id. at 818; see also
ARTHUR S. LEONARD, SEXUALITY AND THE LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MAJOR LE-
GAL CASES 617-21 (1993).
' See discussion infra part IB.
24 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (mandating desegregation in public schools, despite com-
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and the courts cannot tolerate public educational systems that
defy central principles of the Bill of Rights.
I. THE FUNCTION OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN PREPARING ALL
CHILDREN FOR ADULTHOOD
The most effective antidote to the poison of mindless orthodoxy is
ready access to a broad sweep of ideas and philosophies. There is no
danger in such exposure. The danger is in mind control."
Government-provided, compulsory education plays a vital
role in preparing American children to function effectively and
independently in their autonomous adult lives. Public schools
exist to teach children information as well as to provide them
with the background training they will need to participate
meaningfully in our democratic form of government." These
general functions of schools inform the contours of the First
Amendment in that arena and must similarly inform
consitutional review of restrictions on the content of school cur-
ricula. These goals also demonstrate the special importance of
equal public education for young people who grow up to be gay
or lesbian, and emphasize the important role schools can play
in helping to prevent anti-gay violence and other acts of ha-
tred.
A. The Goals of Public Education
As the Supreme Court has recognized, schools play a cru-
cial role in democracy because education "is the very founda-
tion of good citizenship."27 The functions of the public schools
range from the very practical to the more sophisticated. For
example, schools not only strive to ensure that every child be-
comes literate, but attempt to prepare future citizens for in-
formed, thoughtful participation in government. The central
munity resistance, because of the importance of equal educational opportunity).
' Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 715 (D.
Mass. 1978) (invalidating school board decision to remove book containing contro-
versial poem from the school library).
2 See, e.g., Bethel v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) ("'public education must
prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic'"); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68,
77 (1979) ("public schools ... inculcat[e] fundamental values necessary to the
maintenance of a democratic political system").
' Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
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functions of government-sponsored schools include teaching
basic skills, such as communication, critical thinking and deci-
sionmaking, that will help the child in every aspect of adult
life.' In addition, students learn in school how to co-exist
with others, which serves to ensure social calm as they grow
older.' Schools also impart basic knowledge that facilitates
informed individual decisionmaking about their sexuality,
health and family life."0 "In sum, education has a fundamen-
tal role in maintaining the fabric of our society."31
Democratic principles, while a distinct teaching goal them-
selves, actually imbue all of these public school functions. 2
For example, the teaching of tolerance and mutual respect is
" See ARVAL A. MORRIS, THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION
115 (1989) ("By sympathetically developing all students' abilities ... to measure
their opinions by reason, logic, or fact, public schools in America can contribute to
democracy by helping students become the type of ideal citizen envisioned by the
First Amendment."); see also Walter A. Kamiat, State Indoctrination and the Pro-
tection of Non-State Voices in the Schools: Justifying a Prohibition of School Li-
brary Censorship, 35 STAN. L. REV. 497, 523 (1983) (noting that legitimate goals
include "promoting student appreciation for diverse views, independent inquiry,
critical thought, and public debate").
' See, e.g., Bethel, 478 U.S. at 681 (holding that "fundamental values ...
include tolerance of divergent political and religious views, even when the views
expressed may be unpopular"); Ambach, 441 U.S. at 77 (finding that "authorities
have perceived public schools as an 'assimilative force' by which diverse and con-
flicting elements in our society are brought together on a broad but common
ground").
" For instance, parental objections to sex education in schools have consistent-
ly been rejected because of the overriding state interest in providing essential
health information in schools. See, e.g., Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 314 F.
Supp. 340 (Md. 1969), affd, 428 F.2d 471 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942
(1970); Citizen's v. San Mateo County Bd. of Educ., 51 Cal. App. 3d 1 (Ct. App.
1975) (dismissing parents' challenges to sex education in public schools); see also
KERN ALEXANDER & M. DAVID ALEXANDER, AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 168
(1992) (stating that schools "train students in ways of behaving that will stand
them in good stead as they go on to higher education and jobs").
3 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
' For example, "[ciommunication skills promote mature and healthy consider-
ation of community issues through both formal and informal discussion." Allen W.
Hubsch, Education and Self-Government: The Right to Education Under State Con-
stitutional Law, 18 J.L. & EDUC. 93, 96 (1989). Indeed, "among our most impor-
tant democratic values are the disabling of government from acting arbitrarily and
from suppressing dissenting viewpoints and ideas." Betsy Levin, Educating Youth
for Citizenship: The Conflict Between Authority and Individual Rights in the Public
School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647, 1680 (1986); see also Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("Teachers and students must always remain free . .. to
study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding;, otherwise our
civilization will stagnate and die.").
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important not only for social peace, but also to reinforce the
constitutional ideal of protecting minorities against tyranny of
the majority. 3 As the National Education Association has em-
phasized:
[P]ublic schools are the agency of society most essential in bringing
about appreciation for diversity and respect for the rights of all. Yet
it is plain that the schools will not be able to persuade students of
these fundamental values if the State asserts... that discrimina-
tion against one particular minority group is acceptable'
Ideally, public schools encourage an atmosphere of free inquiry
and the free exchange of ideas, since censorship and other
limitations "hardly teach[ ] children to respect the diversity of
ideas that is fundamental to the American system."35 The Su-
preme Court has declared that we "are educating the young for
citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional
freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free
mind at its source and teach youth to discount important prin-
ciples of our government as mere platitudes.""
Thus, courts have stressed the importance of broadening
the spectrum of knowledge within schools to expose students to
a full educational experience, with the goal of "creating a cul-
turally pluralistic society, where general knowledge is the right
of all and not the privilege of a few."3" In contrast, legal schol-
ar Alexander Meiklejohn emphasized that where the govern-
ment takes an "interest in inculcating values for the purpose of
influencing the outcome of future debates," such action rises to
the level of indoctrination and is an abuse of state power.'
' West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1942) ('The
very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to . . . place [certain freedoms] beyond the
reach of majorities and officials.").
' Amici Curiae Brief for the National Education Association et al., at 20, Ev-
ans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993) (No. 93SA17) (arguing to uphold prelimi-
nary injunction of Colorado Amendment 2), cert. denied, 114 U.S. 419 (1993) [here-
inafter Amici Curiae Brief].
' Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 880 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring);
Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 ('The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out
of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selec-
tion.' ").
" West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
, Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395, 400 (D.N.H. 1974) (holding that the First
Amendment does not require schools to excuse children from all school activities
that parents deem offensive).
' Kamiat, supra note 28, at 519 (discussing Meiklejohn's self-government theo-
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There is clear consensus that open access to ideas and skills,
as well as co-existence with diverse fellow students "prepares
students for active and effective participation in the pluralistic
society in which they will soon be adult members. '3 9
B. The Need for Accurate Information About Homosexuality
The gay teenage population in American public schools is
substantial." School, however, often is a difficult environment
for gay youth. In addition to facing the usual difficulties associ-
ated with growing up, gay youth must- try to come to terms
with their sexual identity in a school environment that often
implicitly or explicitly condemns homosexuality. Studies have
shown that teachers frequently offer no support to gay youth
and often are "reluctant to stop harassment or rebut homopho-
bic remarks for fear of being seen as undesirable role mod-
els."41 Silence from teachers and administrators implicitly
condones homophobic attitudes and violence. Furthermore, gay
youth typically receive little or no accurate information about
homosexuality and generally lack positive gay or lesbian role
models.42 Public education's failure to reach its goals of com-
ry that supports "a government interest in inculcating values that would promote
the community's continued capacity to govern itself through critical [thinking] . . .
and independent intellectual inquiry" but would disallow efforts to "predetermine
the outcome of future debates") (citing ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, TEACHER OF
FREEDOM, 160 (1981)). Professor Meiklejohn's views have significantly influenced
scholarly thought on the First Amendment and public education. See, e.g., Robert
H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,
26 (1971); Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amend-
ment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 24 (1975).
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
" Gregory M. Herek, Myths About Sexual Orientation: A Lawyer's Guide to
Social Science Research, 1 L. & SEXUALITY 133, 140 n.23 (1991) ("A common as-
sumption today is that 10% of the United States population is gay."). While the
precise number of gay and lesbian adolescents is difficult to determine, the size of
the adult lesbian and gay population makes clear that a large group of students
in the public schools have started to realize that they are gay or will do so in the
few years after they leave school. See Gary Remafedi, Homosexual Youth: A Chal-
lenge to Contemporary Society, 258 JAMA 222, 223 (1987) (reporting that most
studies find sexual orientation well-established by early childhood).
41 Paul Gibson, Gay Male and Lesbian Youth Suicide, in REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE ON YOUTH SUICIDE 3-110, 3-128 (1989).
4 Id. at 3-133; see also A. Damien Martin & Emery S. Hetrick, The Stigma-
tization of the Gay and Lesbian Adolescent, 15 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 163, 167 (1988)
("There is little or no opportunity for the homosexually oriented adolescent to
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munication, mutual respect, accurate information and a robust
exchange of ideas thus has particular significance for gay
youth.
The hostility directed toward gay youth by their peers may
be attributed to the fact that young people still are forming a
base identity during adolescence and feel threatened by those
perceived to be different.43 Students' fears of and prejudice
toward their gay classmates have led to a high incidence of vio-
lence directed at gay adolescents in schools." One study, for
example, found that forty-five percent of gay males and twenty
percent of lesbians had experienced verbal or physical assault
in secondary school.45 This study also indicated that some gay
youth even "become involved in verbal and physical attacks
against other homosexuals as a way of defending against their
own fears."4" This violence and harassment prevents many
gay teens from forming a supportive peer group at school.47
In addition to the alienation they face at school, gay youth
discover what it means to be homosexual. Therefore, they cannot plan or some-
times even conceive of a future for themselves."); Tabor, supra note 7, at 41
("Physical and emotional changes are complicated by general adolescent awkward-
ness. Being a run-of-the-mill Wally Cleaver is hard enough. Being openly homosex-
ual in high school can seem next to impossible.").
Harvard law professor William N. Eskridge, Jr. has described how stereo-
types contribute to anti-homosexual attitudes and violence in his review, A Social
Constructionist Critique of Posner's Sex and Reason: Steps Toward a Gaylegal
Agenda, 102 YALE L.J. 333 (1992) (book review).
According to [a recently released Kinsey Institute study], even positive or
neutral stereotypes ("homosexuals are artistic") ... which distance a
group of people from the perceived norm, easily become the basis for
negative emotional reactions based upon the group's deviation ("homosex-
uals are distorted heterosexuals"). These negative feelings have behavioral
consequences ("avoid homosexuals") and create a mindset that is prone
to ... harm.
Id. at 364-65; see also MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION,
EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW 21 (1990) (discussing how the concept of "differ-
ence grows from the ways in which this society assigns individuals to categories
and, on that basis, determines whom to include in and whom to exclude").
"" Arthur Lipkin, Project 10, TEACHING TOLERANCE, Fall 1992, at 25 ("Of all
the minorities in American school populations, young gays and lesbians are among
the most frequently ridiculed, victimized and shunned.").
' Gibson, supra note 41, at 3-112 (citing study by NATIONAL GAY TASK FORCE,
ANTI-GAY/LESBIAN VICTIMIZATION (1984)); see also Joyce Hunter, Violence Against
Lesbian and Gay Male Youths, 5 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 295, 297 (1990)
(study of 500 gay youth found that 40% experienced "violent physical attacks").
4 Gibson, supra note 41, at 3-118.
4 Gibson, supra note 41, at 3-122.
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often are rejected by their family members." Many families
that are members of racial or ethnic minorities prepare their
children for the harassment they may face in the world and
provide support when their children encounter oppressive
treatment'4 9 In contrast, once a gay youth's family suspects or
discovers their child's sexual orientation they frequently add to
the child's mistreatment." The result is that "gay and lesbian
youth report[ ] a higher incidence of verbal and physical abuse
from parents and siblings than other youth. They [are] more
often forced to leave their homes as 'pushaways' or
'throwaways' rather than running away on their own."5'
Adding to the isolation gay youth experience at home and
in school, many gay and lesbian advocates and educators are
reluctant to become involved with the problems faced by gay
youth.52 This hesitancy stems from the erroneous stereotype
that adult gay men and lesbians are a threat to children,53 as
' Gibson, supra note 41, at 3-112; see also Hunter, supra note 45, at 297 (61%
of violence against gay youth occurs within the family); Emery S. Hetrick & A.
Damien Martin, Developmental Issues and Their Resolution for Gay and Lesbian
Adolescents, 14 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 25, 29 (1987).
Hetrick & Martin, supra note 42, at 166 (citation omitted).
Gary Remafedi et al., Risk Factors for Attempted Suicide in Gay and Bisex-
ual Youth, 87 PEDIATRICS 869, 874 (1991) (reporting that a study of gay youth
who attempted suicide found "[iflamily problems were the most frequently cited
reason for [suicide] attempts"); see also Bull, supra note 5, at 53 (recounting story
of gay youth forcibly removed from his home by police after school guidance coun-
selor told boy's parents that their son might be gay).
" Gibson, supra note 41, at 3-112. For this reason, some psychologists who
work with gay youth "strongly recommend to clients who are still in high school
that they think very carefully before coming out to their parents . . . hav[ing]
seen several instances where a young person, confident of the love of his or her
parents, reveals his or her homosexuality and then ends up on the street." Hetrick
& Martin, supra note 48, at 35. Indeed, it is estimated that 30 to 50% of New
York City's homeless youth are gay or lesbian. See Jesse Green, This School Is
Out, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1991, § 6 (Magazine), at 32.
2 Jesse Green, Out and Organized, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1993, § 9, at 1 (re-
porting that national lesbian and gay rights movement often is reluctant to ad-
dress youth issues).
Two prevalent stereotypes involve recruitment and pedophilia. See, e.g., Cole
v. Board of Educ., No. 22349/93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Oct. 22, 1993) (complaint
alleging that Hetrick-Martin Institute for Lesbian and Gay Youth, which developed
informational materials on sexual identity and AIDS issues for New York City
public schools, encourages and facilitates pedophilia). Recruitment arguments ig-
nore the data demonstrating that sexual identity is well-formed by an early age
and thus exposure to gay and lesbian people will not alter a person's sexual orien-
tation. Herek, supra note 40, at 148-52 ("the assertion that homosexuality is a
choice that can be changed is erroneous for the vast majority of lesbians and gay
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well as the risk of dismissal should school officials discover
that a teacher is gay or lesbian.54 Even gay and lesbian teach-
ers who advise support groups for gay students may conceal
their sexual orientation.55 This hesitancy to be truthful fur-
ther reinforces the idea that there is something wrong and
shameful about being gay."6
Compounding these problems is the fact that gay adoles-
cents face hostility in a range of institutional settings. Parents
and teachers concerned that the adolescent is expressing an
attraction to members of the same sex or is failing to conform
to stereotypical gender roles often coerce gay youth into psychi-
atric treatment.57 These interventions can worsen conditions
men"); see also Chandler Burr, Homosexuality and Biology, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Mar. 1993, at 47 (summarizing recent scientific developments regarding the possi-
ble genetic basis for homosexual orientation).
The pedophilia myth is similarly one with no basis in fact. Statistics repeat-
edly demonstrate that it is overwhelmingly heterosexual men, and usually family
members, who are responsible for child molestation. See Herek, supra note 40, at
152-56 (reviewing literature relating to the sexual orientation of child molesters);
Carole Jenny et al., Are Children at Risk for Sexual Abuse by Homosexuals?, 94
PEDIATRICS 41 (1994) (reviewing records in a child sexual abuse clinic that re-
vealed that children were far more likely to be abused by a close relative's het-
erosexual partner than by a homosexual).
"' Under current but questionable equal protection law, "school boards can dis-
miss teachers upon discovery of their sexual orientation or the acknowledgement
by teachers that they are gay." Donna L Dennis & Ruth E. Harlow, Gay Youth
and the Right to Education, 4 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 446, 472 (1986) (citing
Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. Dist., 559 P.2d 1340 (Wash.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879
(1977), and Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985), both upholding dismissals of schoolteachers for
being homosexual).
" Zsa Zsa Gershick, Virginia Is for Students, ADVOCATE, Sept. 7, 1993, at 57
(interviewing Virginia Uribe of Los Angeles' Project 10, which provides counseling
for gay and lesbian youth); see also Dennis & Harlow, supra note 54, at 473
("teachers conceal their identity even from gay students, fearing discovery and
retaliation from school authorities").
' Gershick, supra note 55, at 57; see also Dennis & Harlow, supra note 54, at
473 ("[g]ay students are made to feel inferior when they know that gay teachers
must lie about their identities"); Martin & Hetrick, supra note 42, at 173.
" Hetrick & Martin, supra note 42, at 169 ("adolescents whose [sexual identity
is] discovered are often pushed by parents, counselors, [or] health profession-
als . . . into attempts to change or deny their orientation, despite evidence that
such efforts are useless and dangerous"); Joyce Hunter & Robert Schaecher, Stress-
es on Lesbian and Gay Adolescents in Schools, 9 SOC. WORK IN EDUC. 180, 185
(1987) (writing that "parental reactions to the revelation of an adolescent's homo-
sexuality can include . . . insistence on therapy to 'change' the young person");
Eve K. Sedgwick, How to Bring Your Kids Up Gay, 29 SOCIAL TEXT 18 (1991) (ex-
amining experience of children forced into therapy due to their lack of conformity
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for gay youth who encounter therapists and social workers who
are unwilling to acknowledge or support an adolescent's gay or
lesbian identity." Furthermore, many youth are themselves
reluctant to reveal their sexual identity issues and therefore
never resolve their conflicts.59
The result of all these factors is great alienation among
gay youth." Schools that allow abuse and harassment of
these students or fail to provide accurate information about
homosexuality, ultimately deny gay and lesbian students an
equal, welcoming environment for learning. The end result for
gay youth is that the "shame of ridicule and the fear of attack
makes school a fearful place to go, resulting in frequent ab-
sences and sometimes academic failure."6 Many gay youth
feel compelled to drop out altogether.62
An even greater problem resulting from systematic lack of
support is that a significant number of gay teenagers attempt
to take their own lives. One study in the Report of the Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services Task Force on Youth Sui-
cide reported that "gay youth are 2 to 3 times more likely to
attempt suicide than other young people.... [and] may com-
prise up to 30 percent of completed youth suicides annual-
ly."' 3 Indeed, suicide remains the leading cause of death
among gay youth.64 Rather than reflecting an innate propensi-
to gender roles).
Gibson, supra note 41, at 3-113.
Gibson, supra note 41, at 3-114.
See generally AARON FRICKE, REFLECTIONS OF A ROCK LOBSTER: A STORY
ABouT GROWING UP GAY (1981) (autobiographical account of gay high school stu-
dent who successfully sued his school for the right to bring a male date to the
prom).
61 Gibson, supra note 41, at 3-112 to 3-113.
62 Gibson, supra note 41, at 3-113 (reporting that 28% of gay male high school
students in the study were forced to drop out of school due to conflicts related to
their sexual orientation) (citing Gary Remafedi, Male Homosexuality: The
Adolescent's Perspective (1985) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Adolescent
Health Program, University of Minnesota)); see also Green, supra note 51, at 32.
' Gibson, supra note 41, at 3-110. This study was released in the summer of
1989 by the Department of Health and Human Services (M)HRS"). Within months,
Dr. Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary of DIIHS under President Bush, repudiated the
section of the report that recommended ending discrimination against youths on
the basis of sexual orientation. In a written statement, Dr. Sullivan attacked not
the accuracy of the report, but its anti-discriminatory views. He stated: "I am
strongly committed to advancing traditional family values.... In my opinion, the
views expressed in the paper run contrary to that aim." Sedgwick, supra note 57,
at 18. Because of Sullivan's discomfort, the report was not widely circulated. Id.
14 Gibson, supra note 41, at 3-110; see also Joyce Murdoch, Gay Youths' Deadly
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ty for self-destructiveness, gay youth suicide is the result of a
society that discriminates against and stigmatizes homosexuals
while failing to recognize or support the substantial number of
youth who face issues of sexual orientation.6 5 Many commen-
tators, therefore, have urged school systems to include compre-
hensive information on sexual orientation issues to combat the
high suicide rate and other problems confronting gay youth.6
An education system that openly and accurately addresses
homosexuality benefits all students, not only those who may be
gay. Such education is not only necessary for the effective
education and development of gay youth but reinforces critical
democratic values in those other students who may otherwise
view homosexuals as a group to be ridiculed and attacked.67
By including a full range of perspectives about homosexuality
where the topic arises in the curriculum, schools would encour-
age students to develop their own views and opinions. In addi-
tion, providing accurate information helps students to under-
stand and respect people who may seem "different," an essen-
tial lesson for ensuring stability in our diverse society.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT PRECEDENT IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL
CONTEXT
Numerous Supreme Court opinions have addressed con-
flicts between school officials' decisions and the first amend-
ment rights of students and teachers. The Court repeatedly
Despair: High Rate of Suicide Attempts Tracked, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1988, at
Al.
65 Gibson, supra note 41, at 3-126 (noting that there is nothing inherently self-
destructive about homosexuality, but that in addition to the absence of support for
gay youth in schools, popular culture reinforces negative images, including suicide).
" See, e.g., Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 34, at 14; Gibson, supra note 41, at
3-128; Hunter, supra note 45, at 299; Remafedi, supra note 40, at 225; see also
Dennis & Harlow, supra note 54, at 459-60 (arguing that states should be re-
quired to ensure equal educational opportunity for gay youth under state consti-
tutional right to education).
" Allowing anti-gay behavior "calls into question one of the most important
values the schools attempt to teach their students-tolerance and respect for those
who are different." Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 34, at 19. In addition, the high
rate of anti-gay attacks perpetuated by teens provides concrete evidence of the
harmful effects of homophobic attitudes. See NEW YORK CITY GAY & LESBIAN AN-
TI-VIOLENCE PROJECT, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (in New York City, 70% of anti-
gay/lesbian bias crimes are committed by persons under the age of 25).
" See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kulineier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Tinker v.
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has recognized that school officials require a degree of opera-
tional autonomy to carry out their role of educating students,
and therefore has stated that first amendment conflicts must
be analyzed "in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment." 9 The First Amendment, however, prevents
school officials from infringing upon the rights of students by
trying to advance majoritarian "community values" so zealous-
ly that they violate essential democratic ideals.70 Thus, de-
spite this special context, inevitable curriculum choices cannot
be employed to brainwash students.
Courts have attempted to afford local public school officials
autonomy in determining a course of instruction and operating
their educational system while also preserving students' first
amendment rights of free expression and inquiry. Courts gen-
erally allow schools to make decisions regarding curriculum
content7' and to restrict how members of the school communi-
ty may express their personal views. The schools' actions, how-
ever, must be necessary to prevent substantial disruption with
the schools' educational mission72 or must be related to legiti-
mate educational concerns.73 Because students' right to re-
ceive information also must be preserved, school-imposed re-
strictions on teachers' or students' speech are unconstitutional
if they eliminate access to a particular idea, 4 compel adher-
ence to a single view by shortcutting the educational pro-
cess, 7 5 or present inaccurate or misleading information.76 The
First Amendment permits schools to educate, not to indoctri-
Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
" Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 868 (1982) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S.
at 506 and Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266).
71 "IThe Court, therefore, has acknowledged the force of the principle that
schools, like other enterprises operated by the State, may not be run in such a
manner as to 'prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion.'" Pico, 457 U.S. at 876 (quoting West Virginia State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
71 Steirer ex rel. Steirer v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d 989 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 85 (1993).
72 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
Pico, 457 U.S. at 872.
' Barnette, 319 U.S. at 631.
7' Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968) (although decided on estab-
lishment clause grounds, discusses how schools should not favor one doctrine
where many are valid because it may be misleading to students); see also discus-
sion infra notes 177-84 and accompanying text.
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nate, and courts, therefore, at times will restrict schools' au-
tonomy.
A. The Schools' Interests
Courts traditionally are reluctant to involve themselves in
disputes regarding public school educational policies. The Su-
preme Court has stressed that "[c]ourts do not and cannot
intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily
operation of school systems and which do not directly and
sharply implicate basic constitutional values."77 Thus, courts
afford state and local school officials considerable discretion in
operating public schools." This discretion entitles schools not
only to decide the general subjects to be taught but also to
regulate speakers who seriously disrupt the functioning of the
school or whose views erroneously might be attributed to the
school itself.
This enhanced level of deference has led some courts to
uphold schools' right to make content-based restrictions. Near-
ly all government regulations that restrict speech on the basis
of its subject-matter or content violate the First Amend-
ment." Due to the unique nature of the state's role in run-
ning the schools, however, school authorities are allowed great-
er discretion than other government regulators. 0 Courts rec-
ognize that school officials necessarily must make content-
based decisions in determining what students will learn.81
Thus, for example, school boards constitutionally may establish
mandatory subject-matter requirements for students, even
where these standards ultimately are based upon favoring one
7' Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104.
78 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987).
Content-based regulations restrict speech on the basis of the subject matter
expressed. Such restrictions warrant strict judicial scrutiny; i.e., the state must
demonstrate that the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest
and infringes upon constitutional rights no greater than necessary. See Police Dep't
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98-99, 102 (1972) (striking down an ordinance that allowed
peaceful labor picketing near schools as impermissibly content-based and not nar-
rowly tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest). The application of this
standard is nearly always fatal to state regulations. Id.
0 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
81 See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 281 (1981) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) (striking down university's ban on use of its facilities by religious groups as
viewpoint-based discrimination).
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subject or activity over another.82
Indeed, local school boards, as popularly-elected bodies,
are expected to represent the concerns of their constituents to
ensure that the curriculum reflects local needs.' Nonetheless,
this authority must be confined to instilling values in a man-
ner that comports with the Constitution." Thus, some deci-
sions about school curricula content are unconstitutional be-
cause the school board intends to suppress a particular view-
point.85
Many recent cases involving first amendment claims in the
public school context have considered the constitutionality of
barring students' and teachers' access to school forums to pro-
mote their personal views. The schools' actions in these cases
were prompted by the need to prevent the disruption of school
activities or the expression of views that could be erroneously
attributed to the school.8 6 In analyzing these cases, courts
have applied public forum standards in the public school con-
text. A challenge to curriculum bans, however, is different from
schools' interest in regulating outsiders whose speech might
disrupt or be attributed to the schools since the schools them-
selves formulate the curricula." Thus, while public forum cas-
' Steirer ex rel. Steirer v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d 989, 993 (3d
Cir.) ("The gamut of courses in a school's curriculum necessarily reflects the value
judgements of those responsible for its development, yet requiring students to
study course materials, write papers on the subjects, and take the examinations is
not prohibited by the First Amendment."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 85 (1993).
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
,' Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982).
Id. at 864-65; see also infra part ll.B.
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270-71.
' School curricula have been described as a paradigmatic example of govern-
mental speech. See, e.g., Mark G. Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a The-
ory of Government Expression and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 863, 874-
75 (1979). Although the First Amendment requires that "the government must
regulate expressive activity with an even hand if it regulates," where the govern-
ment acts in a capacity other than as a regulator it need not always be ideologi-
cally neutral. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 814 (2d ed. 1988);
see also Robert D. Kamenshine, The First Amendments Implied Political Establish-
ment Clause, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1104, 1104 (1979) (stating that the "freedom of
speech clause contains no express prohibition against political establishment-the
advocacy of political viewpoints by or with the assistance of government"). Thus,
many functions of government "such as schools, prisons, hospitals and military
installations serve legitimate governmental purposes, yet they possess a consider-




es provide insight into how courts should weigh schools' and
students' competing interests under the First Amendment, the
public forum approach is not definitive in determining the
constitutionality of curricular mandates.
In a traditional public forum, such as a public park or
street, or a "created" public forum, where the government in-
tentionally designates a place of communication as open to the
public, the government may enforce content-based restrictions
only if necessary to serve a compelling state interest and if the
regulation is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 8 In ar-
ticulating public forum standards for first amendment claims
in school settings, the Supreme Court has set forth two related
tests. The first is a general test for speech occurring on school
premises that allows regulation only where the speech actually
causes material and substantial interference with the school's
educational function.89 The second test involves a more le-
nient standard for restrictions on "school-sponsored" speech by
students and allows restrictions if the state's actions are rea-
sonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." Under
While the First Amendment restricts schools and their curricula, courts recog-
nize the government's special interest in favoring certain ideological goals within
the schools. See, e.g., Pico, 457 U.S. at 861 (articulating "constitutional limits upon
the power of the State to control even the curriculum"); id. at 910 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that "actions by the government as educator do not raise the
same First Amendment concerns as actions by the government as sovereign"). To
deter abuse of this role, "some diversity of viewpoints must be ensured, not by
limiting the spectrum of views that the school system may communicate, ...but
by providing genuine opportunities for more speech." TRIBE, supra, at 814; see also
Levin, supra note 32, at 1654 (pointing out that "if educational institutions are not
subject to the same constitutional constraints as other governmental agencies,
students will not come to an understanding of the value of a democratic, participa-
tory society").
' Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985);
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-49 (1983) (union
not representing school teachers had no right of access to teachers' school mailbox-
es because school had not opened the boxes for indiscriminate use by the public).
In non-public forums, however, where the government has limited public access
due to the need to carry on business, speech "may be restricted by government
regulation as long as the regulation is reasonable and not an effort to suppress
expression merely because officials oppose the speaker's view." Perry, 460 U.S. at
46. Most school cases fall under the non-public forum category because, in order to
fulfill its educational goals, the school cannot allow indiscriminate public access to
the schools and classrooms. See, e.g., Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267.
' Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511
(1969).
"' Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
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either test, restrictions may limit speech that materially inter-
feres with schools' educational mission but cannot be intended
to suppress a particular viewpoint.9'
One line of Supreme Court cases defines the standard of
review for restrictions of student expression on school grounds.
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Community
District,92 the Court articulated the governing test for such re-
strictions. The Court stated that a regulation is proper only
when the speech actually causes "material and substantial
interference" with the school's educational mission and is not
aimed at suppressing a particular viewpoint.93 The material
and substantial interference standard requires more than "a
mere desire to avoid the discomfort that always accompanies
an unpopular viewpoint."94 To censor expression, school offi-
cials must demonstrate a verifiable, non-hypothetical disrup-
tion. As the Court stated:
in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance
is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression....
Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that
deviates from the views of another person may start an argument or
cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this
risk 5
Thus, unless a genuine, substantial interference can be proven,
schools' authority to restrict school ground speech is limited.
In contrast to the standard of review articulated in Tinker,
which involved student speech that "happen[ed] to occur on the
school premises,"96 Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier applied a more
lenient standard of review to restrictions on students' or
teachers' personal expression that might be perceived as
" See, e.g., Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1324 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding
regulation invalid because viewpoint-based, even though the forum was non-public);
see also Gail P. Sorenson, The Public Forum Doctrine and Its Application in
School and College Cases, 20 J.L. & EDUC. 445, 458-59 (1991) (discussing prohi-
bition on viewpoint discrimination in all forums).
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
3 Id. at 511.
94 Id. at 509.
" Id. at 508; see also Brooks v. Auburn, 412 F.2d 1171, 1173 (5th Cir. 1969)
(allowing convict to speak at school because officials failed to show speaker would
cause actual disruption).
" Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
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"school-sponsored" speech." Although Hazelwood at times
refers to the curriculum generally, a more logical reading of
the case limits the application of its standard to "curriculum-
related activities.""8 Such activities were defined as encom-
passing "school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions
and other expressive activities that students, parents, and
members of the community might reasonably perceive to bear
the imprimatur of the school."99 Under this standard a school
could justify its regulation of such speech by demonstrating
legitimate pedagogical concerns that are not viewpoint-
based."'
Although the Hazelwood standard for restrictions on
"school-sponsored" speech is more lenient than the Tinker
standard for speech on school property, the requirement of
legitimate pedagogical concerns is more burdensome than a
mere rational basis standard. Schools must substantiate a
nexus between the speech restricted and the asserted educa-
tional concerns. 1' For example, one court rejected increased
regulations on speech where the school failed to demonstrate
that it had experienced any problems with its prior poli-
cies."0 2 Similarly, courts presume that severe restrictions,
" Id. at 272-73.
9' Id. at 271. The concern addressed by the Hazelwood public forum standard
is that others might perceive an individual's speech or views as being advocated
by the school. Id. The curriculum, however, is created by the school and thus
there is no risk of erroneous attribution.
" Id.; see also Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 776 (10th Cir. 1991)
(allowing punishment for teacher's classroom expression of his personal views as
"school-sponsored" speech). This category includes outside organizations attempting
to use school programs to publicize their own beliefs and agendas. See Planned
Parenthood v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1991) (school publi-
cations); Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314 (11th Cir. 1989) (school-sponsored ca-
reer-day program).
100 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 ("educators do not offend the First Amendment
by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in
school-sponsored activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legiti-
mate pedagogical concerns").
... Searcey, 888 F.2d.at 1321 (rejecting school's argument that it need only offer
any reasonable justification as "overstat[ing] the deference a court must pay to
School Board decisions"); Desilets v. Clearview, 630 A.2d 333, (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1993) (rejecting educational justifications offered by school as insufficient
to justify removing student articles from school-sponsored newspaper).
..2 Searcey, 888 F.2d at 1322 (striking down newly enacted restriction where
"[t~here is no evidence which even arguably explains the Board's change in posi-
tion").
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such as banning a group from the school, are unreasonable
because such regulations diminish students' access to informa-
tion and thus conflict with the very purpose of the educational
setting.
10 3
Under the Hazelwood standard, however, schools not only
may regulate speech that substantially interferes with their
educational function (as articulated in Tinker), but also may
justify the manner in which "school-sponsored" speech is pre-
sented on the basis of legitimate pedagogical concerns. Courts
have ruled that the range of valid concerns includes the
audience's level of maturity,"4 the goal of maintaining high
academic standards,"5 the quality and fairness of the presen-
tation,' the desire to protect all students' participation in
school activities,"07 and the preservation of the school's neu-
trality on issues of public debate.'
School's concerns for regulating speech to maintain an age-
appropriate presentation clearly serves a legitimate education-
al interest. In Bethel v. Fraser,"9 for example, school authori-
ties punished a student for presenting a vulgar speech at a
mandatory assembly before the entire school. The Court found
that school officials were not attempting to restrict the view-
point expressed in the speech but rather legitimately had ob-
jected to the student's obscene manner of presentation."0 The
Court held that the school had acted within its discretion be-
cause it had required all students, even the youngest, to attend
this assembly and thus had a responsibility to ensure that the
speech was educationally suitable for its audience."'
Hazelwood provides an example of how schools may limit
student speech to preserve schools' educational integrity."'
In Hazelwood, the school principal removed two student arti-
103 Id. ("It is the total banning of a group from the forum-rather than limiting
what a group can say-that we find to be unreasonable.").
'0' See Bethel v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986).
'o See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988).
106 Id.; Miles v. Denver Pub. High Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 778 (10th Cir. 1991).
'o See Crosby ex rel. Crosby v. Holsinger, 852 F.2d 801, 802 (4th Cir. 1988).
100 See Planned Parenthood v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817, 830 (9th
Cir. 1991).
1o9 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
x'o Id. at 685.
011 Id.
" 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
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cles from a school newspaper that had been written as part of
a journalism class."' The censored articles addressed teen
pregnancy within the high school and the impact of divorce on
students."' Student members of the newspapers' staff chal-
lenged the principal's action, alleging that he had censored the
articles because he disagreed with the controversial view-
points."' The Court agreed with the school's assertion that
the removed articles failed to meet the educational standards
of the journalism class. In particular, the Court found that the
anonymity of the pregnant students mentioned in the article
on teen pregnancy had not been adequately protected and that
the schoors actions were motivated by a desire to safeguard
the students' privacy. 6 Similarly, the school showed that the
article concerning divorce contained unverified incriminating
statements regarding the behavior of certain parents. 7 The
Supreme Court, therefore, found that the school's reasons for
removing the articles were both educationally sound and non-
viewpoint-based."'
In addition, courts have allowed schools to proscribe stu-
dent speech to preserve educational opportunity for other stu-
dents. In Crosby ex rel. Crosby v. Holsinger,"9 for example,
the Fourth Circuit allowed school officials to remove a racially
offensive school mascot, "Johnny Reb."'2 ° The court found
that the first amendment interests of the students who had
chosen the mascot to represent their image of the school were
outweighed by the fact that the symbol "offended black [stu-
dents] and limited [their] participation in school activities."2
Thus, the school officials' efforts to ensure the equal participa-
tion of all its students was a sufficient educational goal which
could only be achieved by completely removing the symbol."
"1 Id. at 263-64.
14 Id.
16 Id. at 264.
.. Id. at 274-75.
"" Id. at 275; see also Miles v. Denver Pub. High Sch., 944 F.2d 773 (10th Cir.
1991) (upholding reprimand of teacher who repeated a non-verified rumor in class
that implicated privacy of two students).
118 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 276.
119 852 F.2d 801 (4th Cir. 1988).
120 Id. at 803.
121 Id. at 802.
u Id. Similarly, schools may validly restrict student speech to calm racial ten-
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Finally, in situations where a school has remained neutral
in an ongoing public debate, the court will not force it to dis-
seminate a citizen's one-sided views if such an action would
appear to bear the school's approval. In Planned Parenthood v.
Clark County School Board, the Ninth Circuit upheld a high
school's ban on any advertising related to issues surrounding
birth control in its publications." Because the school year-
book, sports programs and newspapers had rejected advertise-
ments both for and against the use of birth control, the school
was immune from allegations of partisanship in this conten-
tious debate. 24 The court reasoned that the prohibition did
not limit students' access to this important information be-
cause other, more reliable sources could provide such infor-
mation and, furthermore, students were unlikely to seek out
family planning information in these particular publica-
tions." The court made clear, however, that if the school
previously had taken a position on this issue, its claim of "neu-
trality" would have been rejected. 2
Thus, courts grant local school officials considerable auton-
omy in the daily operation of public schools, including decisions
about course selection and the needs of the local community.
Although schools also may regulate students' and teachers'
speech that disrupts the schools' educational mission or errone-
ously will be attributed to the school, such power is not unlim-
ited.
sions or prevent disruptions. See, e.g., Augustus v. School Bd., 507 F.2d 156 (5th
Cir. 1975) (upholding court order banning use of the name "Rebels" and Confeder-
ate Flag as a school symbol because they contributed to racial tension and disrup-
tion); Melton v. Young, 465 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir.) (upholding student's suspension
for refusing to remove Confederate flag patch which increased racial tensions), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1972).
941 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1991).
12 Id. at 829.
125 Id.
" Id. at 828-29; see also San Diego Committee Against Registration and the
Draft (CARD) v. Governing Bd. of Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 790 F.2d
1471, 1481 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that by allowing ads regarding military service
in school paper, school could not then reject ads by those opposed to the military
under a rationale of maintaining neutrality).
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B. The Students' Interests
Despite giving broad deference to school authorities' dis-
cretion in governing public schools, the Supreme Court never
has considered this power to be absolute. As the Court has
declared, "[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech
or expression at the schoolhouse gate."27 First amendment
protection against improper indoctrination is among the rights
that young people in school maintain. This protection falls
within the general right to receive information and ideas free-
ly," and specifically includes three subsidiary rights: the
right to be exposed to all sides of controversial issues;2 ' the
right not to be compelled to hold a particular belief;3 0 and
the right not to be misled in the school setting.'
1. The Overarching Right to Receive Information
The overarching right to receive information under the
First Amendment exists in a variety of contexts,132 including
public schools.' Students' right to receive information pre-
cludes schools from imposing its ideas via the classroom or
otherwise intentionally suppressing access to ideas. As the
Supreme Court stated: "In our system, students may not be
regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the
" Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
("This has been the unmistakable holding of this court for nearly 50 years."); see
also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) ("[Our courts . . .have not
failed to apply the First Amendment's mandate in our educational system where
essential to safeguard the fundamental values of freedom of speech and inquiry.").
18 See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 868 (1982).
m See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
"' See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
1 See Epperson, 393 U.S. at 107.
12 See, e.g., Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976) (upholding right to receive advertising because essential to effec-
tive decisionmaking); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-3 (1972) (upholding
right to receive information and ideas); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S.
301 (1965) (upholding right to receive political publications from abroad); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (upholding right to "receive information
about abortion").
' Pico, 457 U.S. at 866-67; Zykan v. Warsaw Community Sch. Corp., 631 F.2d
1300, 1304 (7th Cir. 1980); Minarcini v. Strongville City Sch. Dist., 541 F.2d 577,
583 (6th Cir. 1976).
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State chooses to communicate. They may not be confined to the
expression of those sentiments that are officially ap-
proved."'1
34
In the 1967 decision, Keyishian v. Board of Regents,135
the Supreme Court articulated the first amendment prohibi-
tion against "laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom. 136 In Keyishian, the Court struck down as uncon-
stitutionally vague a New York statute that permitted firing
public university professors for "seditious utterances or dis-
tributing material advocating overthrow of the govern-
ment."3 7 The Keyishian Court recognized that students
should not be placed in an artificial atmosphere that "protects"
them from challenging ideas."3 Rather, the Court noted that
the role of education is to expose students to diverse view-
points to teach them to assess competing ideas in preparation
for their full participation in a democratic society.'39
In 1982, the Supreme Court, in Board of Education v.
Pico,' further clarified the scope of students' right to receive
information. Pico involved students' challenge to a school
board's removal of selected books from its elementary and
secondary school libraries. In its analysis of the school's ac-
tions, the Court stressed the importance of the school's motiva-
tion for curtailing information. The Supreme Court found first
amendment values directly implicated because the local school
board had impermissibly "contract[ed] the spectrum of avail-
able knowledge" and infringed upon the students' right to
receive information and ideas.'
The Court was particularly disturbed by the fact that the
school board had been motivated by a list of "inappropriate"
books it had received from a national conservative parents'
"' Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511
(1969).
385 U.S. 589 (1967).
'6 Id. at 603.
" Id. Although the statute was challenged by state university professors, the
prohibition on imposing orthodoxy has been interpreted to apply to all levels of
public education. See, e.g., Pico, 457 U.S. at 870 (elementary and secondary
schools); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 (high schools).
"' Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 385, 603 (1967).
"' Id. at 603 ("The classroom is particularly the market place of ideas.").
140 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
14 Id. at 866-67.
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organization. The board had removed the books from its
shelves without conducting any independent review of the
banned books." The Court held that a school board cannot
intend to bar access to controversial ideas, concluding that
"purposeful suppression of ideas" is unconstitutional because
the "imposition of ideological discipline is not a proper under-
taking for school authorities."'
Pico, therefore, established that courts must consider the
underlying motivation for school policies that restrict speech.
An "abrupt change in policy" or other action that "supports an
inference that the [state] intended to suppress... views" will
render the school's policy unconstitutional.' Even when
school officials offer educational justifications for suppressing
information, courts will consider whether they are "merely a
facade for viewpoint-based discrimination." '145 In addition,
courts presume that restricting knowledge in an educational
setting is improper because presenting only positive or nega-
tive information defeats the school's educational purpose of
"providing [students] with an optimum level of informa-
'42 Id. at 857-58 (finding school board described the banned books as "un-Ameri-
can" and "just plain filthy").
1 Id. at 877 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The plurality asserts that the school
board "might well defend their claim of absolute discretion in matters of curricu-
lum by reliance on their duty to inculcate community values." Id. at 862. Thus, a
literal reading of the plurality opinion suggests applying this principle more le-
niently to curriculum restrictions. As reaffirmed earlier in the opinion, however,
the Supreme Court has "long recognized certain constitutional limits upon the
power of the State to control even the curriculum." Id. at 861. Moreover, the claim
that students' interest in preventing indoctrination in the mandatory curriculum
might be weaker than in a voluntarily utilized library simply defies common
sense; curriculum restrictions systematically constrict all students' spectrum of
knowledge. See id. at 878 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (declaring distinction between
library and classroom irrelevant to constitutional analysis because both inculcate
knowledge); id. at 892 (Burger, J., dissenting) (critical of distinction); id. at 914
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (same).
... Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1325 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding abrupt
change in policy adopted after unpopular group requested access to school forum
"supports an inference that the Board intended to suppress" the group's views); see
also Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 712 (D.
Mass. 1978) (rejecting school officials' resolution, created in response to parental
complaints of censorship, as "a self-serving document that rewrote history in an
effort to meet the issues of this litigation. In simple terms, it was pretext.").
... Searcey, 888 F.2d at 1324 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense &
Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 811 (1985)); see also Virgil v. School Bd., 862 F.2d
1517, 1522-23 (11th Cir. 1989); Student Coalition for Peace v. Lower Merion Sch.,
776 F.2d 431, 437 (3d Cir. 1985).
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tion." 46
2. The Right to Be Exposed to All Sides of Controversial
Issues
Thus, Pico relies upon the first amendment right of stu-
dents to freely receive information in the schools to prohibit
regulations intended to suppress one side of a debate.147 Un-
der this rationale, courts prohibit restrictions on speech in the
curriculum where they are based on school officials' disagree-
ment with the political views of the speech,'48 where the re-
striction seeks to further a biased agenda,'49 or where the on-
ly offered justification is that certain parents in the community
find the speech offensive. 5 '
Courts have held that schools cannot ban or restrict
speech merely because it conflicts with parents' or school
officials' political views.' 5' For instance, in Salvail v. Nashua
Board of Education,52 a New Hampshire district court re-
fused to allow a school library to remove Ms. Magazine from its
shelves where its only proffered reason for doing so was that
certain school officials found the political slant of the magazine
"' Searcey, 888 F.2d at 1322.
... Pico, 457 U.S. at 871 ("Our Constitution does not permit the official suppres-
sion of ideas."); Pratt v. Independent Sch. Dist. 670 F.2d 771, 776 (8th Cir. 1982)
("At the very least, the First Amendment precludes local authorities from imposing
a 'pall of orthodoxy' on classroom instruction which implicates the state in the
propagation of a particular religious or ideological viewpoint."); Bell v. U-2 Bd. of
Educ., 630 F. Supp. 939, 994 (D. Vt. 1986) ("School boards . .. may not deny
access to ideas in a way that prescribes an orthodoxy in matters of opinion."); see
also SORENSON, supra note 91, at 458-59 (viewpoint discrimination never allowed).
,' Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 510-11
(1969) (singling out one particular political opinion for prohibition unconstitutional);
Minarcini v. Strongville City Sch. Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1976) (removal
of library books based solely on political tastes of school board was unconstitution-
al).
1 Loewen v. Turnipseed, 488 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Miss. 1980).
110 See Dean v. Timpson Indep. Sch. Dist., 486 F. Supp. 302, 308 (E.D. Tex.
1979) ("[t]o exclude a subject from the public school curriculum because it offends
the community . . . runs counter to the spirit of the First Amendment"); see also
Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987) (dismissing
challenge to schoolbook series that offended parent's values); Keefe v. Geanokos,
418 F.2d 359, 361-62 (1st Cir. 1969); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352, 354
(M.D. Ala. 1970) (finding parents' offense not controlling).
, Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510-11; Minarcini, 541 F.2d at 582.
112 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979).
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inappropriate for the students.153 The Salvail court declared
that the school board improperly had attempted to impose the
school authorities' own political views on the students."'
Bans motivated by school authorities' bias against a mi-
nority within the school likewise are impermissible.'55 The
court in Loewen v. Turnipseed,"'56 for example, ruled that a
Mississippi school district's textbook committee had violated
the First Amendment by selecting books that sought to perpet-
uate the committee's racial bias. The court's finding was based
on evidence that the committee had refused to even consider
less-biased textbooks presented to it. 57 Thus, although the
court acknowledged that textbook selection generally is a mat-
ter of local concern, the judge found that the selected textbooks
improperly furthered the committee's own ideas of segregation
and racism.15 The court's opinion emphasized that school of-
ficials cannot commandeer the curriculum to perpetuate their
own prejudiced or harmful political agenda.
Courts also thwart parents who attempt to control the
curriculum as a means of validating their own viewpoint.'59
In Right to Read Defense Committee v. School Committee, 60 a
school banned a library book in response to a parent's com-
plaint that the theme and language of a poem in the book was
offensive. In response, the court described the poem about a
young girl's experience as "challenging and thought-provoking,"
finding its explicit language a fitting depiction of the poem's
harsh theme. 6' The court reminded the parents who had ob-
13 Id. at 1275-76.
14 Id. at 1274.
Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871 (1982) (finding that a racially
motivated, all-white school board who decided "to remove all books authored by
blacks or advocating racial equality" would violate the constitutional rights of the
students denied access to those books).
488 F. Supp. 1138 (NJD. Miss. 1980).
157 Id. at 1154-55.
"8 Id. at 1154.
1.9 See, e.g., Dean v. Timpson Indep. Sch. Dist., 486 F. Supp. 302, 308 (E.D.
Tex. 1979) (determining that the material and substantial interference test is not
based on whether the speech disrupts the community because otherwise "no sub-
ject which differed from the majoritarian view could be taught in the public
schools"); see also Mozert v. Hawkins, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987) (rejecting
parents' claim that certain textbooks should be removed because they were repug-
nant to their religious and family values).
"8o 454 F. Supp. 703, 711 (D. Mass. 1978).
'6' Id. at 714.
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jected to the poem that "their sensibilities are not the full
measure of what is proper education."
1 62
3. The Right to Not Be Compelled to Hold a Particular
Belief
The First Amendment also ensures students' rights to
form and hold personal beliefs, and prevents school authorities
from compelling students to accept state-sanctioned views
within the classroom. 163 While schools may attempt to instill
students with certain "community values," they must maintain
an objective educational process consistent with democratic
ideals. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, "[tihe funda-
mental notion underlying the First Amendment is that citi-
zens, free to speak and hear, will be able to form judgements
concerning matters affecting their lives, independent of any
governmental suasion or propaganda."' 1
Students, like adults, must remain free to form their own
opinions through unimpeded access to views and information.
The Supreme Court case, West Virginia State Board of Educa-
tion v. Barnette,65 provides a dramatic example of a school
that unconstitutionally forced acceptance of its views through
its curriculum. The Court held that a school could not force a
child who disagreed with the political underpinnings of the
pledge of allegiance to recite the pledge.6 6 Although it com-
162 Id. at 713; see also Keefe v. Geanokos, 418 F.2d 359, 362 (1st Cir. 1969)
("thought-provoking" article containing vulgar word could not be removed from
classroom solely based on parents' objections).
16 Commentators have articulated this as the right to formation of belief and
opinion as an adjunct to the First Amendment's protection of the expression of
belief and opinion. See Stephen Arons & Charles Lawrence II, The Manipulation
of Consciousness: A First Amendment Critique of Schooling, HARV. C.R.-CL. L.
REV. 309, 312 (1980) (noting [i]f the government were to regulate the develop-
ment of ideas and opinions . . . freedom of expression would become a meaning-
less right").
164 Right To Read Defense Comm., 454 F. Supp. at 710.
166 319 U.S. 623 (1943).
16 Id. at 642. This means that students and teachers cannot be excluded or
treated differently for refusing to participate in the pledge of allegiance for reasons
of conscience. See Goetz v. Ansell, 477 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1973); Banks v. Board of
Pub. Educ., 314 F. Supp. 285 (S.D. Fla. 1970), vacated, 401 U.S. 988 (1971); Frain
v. Baron, 307 F. Supp. 27 (E.D.N.Y 1969) (precluding expulsion of a student who
refused to stand silently during the pledge of allegiance); see also Russo v. Central
Sch. Dist., 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir.) (finding decision to fire teacher for refusing to
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mended the school's desire to foster an appreciation of constitu-
tional democracy, the Court reasoned that the mandatory flag
salute actually contradicted this goal by violating the student's
first amendment rights.167 The Court refused to allow the
school to bypass teaching an appreciation of constitutional
values by simply enforcing "the compulsory unification of opin-
ion." 6 ' In sum, although the state may validly define the pa-
rameters of the curriculum and even seek to instill democratic
values, schools officials may not achieve their goals in a man-
ner that violates the Constitution.
169
One method of instilling some types of "community values"
in students without shortcutting the educational process was
upheld by the Third Circuit in Steirer ex rel. Steirer v. Bethle-
hem Area School District.7o Steirer involved a high school
graduation requirement that students perform community ser-
vice.17' The court rejected the students' claim that forcing
participation in this program compelled a belief in altru-
ism."'72 Because this curricular program simply required stu-
dents to experience such service and did not restrict them to
recite the pledge of allegiance unconstitutional), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1972);
Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ariz. 1963) (forbidding expulsion of stu-
dent who refused to stand during singing of the national anthem).
6 ' Barnette, 319 U.S. at 646 (concurring opinion) ("Any spark of love for coun-
try which may be generated in a child .. . by forcing him to . . . recite words
wrung from him contrary to his ... beliefs is overshadowed by the desirability of
preserving freedom of conscience to the full. It is in that freedom and the example
of persuasion, not in force and compulsion, that the real unity of America lies.").
"' Id. at 641. As the Court declared, "the State may 'require teaching by in-
struction and study of all in our history and in the structure an organization of
our government, including guarantees of civil liberty which tend to inspire patrio-
tism and love of country'." Id. at 631 (quoting Minerville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310
U.S. 586, 604 (1940)). It may not, however, "shortcut [this process] by substitution
of a compulsory salute and slogan." Id.
"' For an argument that forced acceptance of the "dominant school ideology"
implicates all children's first amendment rights, see Arons & Lawrence, supra note
163, at 328 (recounting personal story of Professor Lawrence of University of San
Francisco: "In the fourth grade I was one of two blacks in my class. Each week
we began the school assembly by singing Old Black Joe and The Caisson
song.... I recall feeling acutely embarrassed and ashamed as we sang these
songs, but I sang along with my friends because they were enjoying it and I did
not want to be different. Were the ritualistic singing of songs that demeaned my
race . . . any less acts of confession than the flag salute in Barnette?").
170 987 F.2d 989 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 85 (1993).
'7' Id. at 997.
172 Id.
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saying only positive things about performing community ser-
vice, the court found that the students remained free to devel-
op their own opinions about the program. 3
4. The Right to Be Free from Misleading Information
Students' first amendment right to receive information
gives youth the right not to be exposed to misleading informa-
tion, and as such ensures that they are exposed to a free and
open educational system that provides for the acquisition of
useful knowledge. This constitutional guarantee prevents
schools from promulgating inaccurate or misleading informa-
tion in the classroom. Courts have not addressed directly the
theory that inaccurate or misleading information violates the
freedom of speech and the right to receive information. None-
theless, the role of public schools in educating students to
participate in democracy 17 4 and the underlying rationale in
many of the free expression cases in the public school context
make clear the imperative of providing students with useful
and thus accurate knowledge.
An analysis of Supreme Court establishment clause cases
facilitates an understanding of a student's right to be free from
misleading information.75 The Court in these cases struck
down statutes that forbade or disadvantaged evolutionary theo-
ry in public schools. 76 In Epperson v. Arkansas,' for exam-
ple, the Court invalidated a state law that precluded teachers
from discussing evolutionary theory within the public school
curriculum. Because evolutionary theory was the prevailing
scientific view regarding human development, Justice
Stewart's concurrence noted that prohibiting students' expo-
sure to this knowledge "impinge[d] upon the guarantees of free
173 Id. (finding students not confined to the expression of "officially approved"
sentiments).
1 See supra part IA.
175 The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment preserves individual free
exercise of religion and prohibits government furtherance of a particular religion.
See U.S. CONST. amend I. It strictly forbids any school activity or policy that fur-
thers a religious purpose. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (disal-
lowing non-denominational prayer at school graduation ceremony).
I76 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (1968).
177 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
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communication contained in the First Amendment" by denying
access to an "entire system of respected human thought.""'
Thus, although Epperson arose under the Establishment
Clause, it also declared that students were entitled to hear
relevant theories and views within the fields of inquiry ad-
dressed by the schools.179
Likewise, in Edwards v. Aguillard,"' the Court struck
down an act that required schools teaching evolutionary theory
to teach the theory of creationism as well. The Court found the
statute unconstitutional because it sought to alter the science
curriculum of public schools to advantage a particular religious
doctrine that "rejects the factual basis of evolution in its en-
tirety."' Again, although the Court invoked the Establish-
ment Clause because of the religious foundation of creationism,
it noted that obstructing the prevailing scientifically supported
view from the school curriculum was itself improper."8 2
"' Epperson, 393 U.S. at 116 (Stewart, J., concurring) (concluding that, because
public schools address human development, teaching creationism as the only legiti-
mate theory infringed on students' first amendment rights because it mandated an
inaccurate and misleading representation of the discipline); see id. at 111 (Black,
J., concurring) ("It is plain that a state law prohibiting all teaching of human
development or biology is constitutionally quite different from a law that compels
a teacher to teach as true only one theory of a given doctrine.").
17 Id. at 107 ("The State's undoubted right to prescribe the curriculum for its
public schools does not carry with it the right to prohibit, on pain of criminal
penalty, the teaching of a scientific theory or doctrine where that prohibition is
based upon reasons that violate the First Amendment."). Even where the school
does not directly discuss a subject, it may not eliminate reference to the existence
of other objective information. Justice Stewart's concurrence offered the example
that, while a State can validly choose to teach only the Spanish language, "a
State [could not] constitutionally ... punish a teacher for letting his students
know that other languages are also spoken in the world." Id. at 116 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
1 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
Id. at 592. Although the statute merely required equal time to creationism if
evolution were taught, the court recognized that this scheme "does not serve to
protect academic freedom, but has the distinctly different purpose of discrediting
'evolution by counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the teaching of cre-
ationism.'" Id. at 589 (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 765 F.2d 1251, 1257 (5th
Cir. 1985)).
18 Id. 482 U.S. at 588 (noting that if the "Legislature's purpose was solely to
maximize the comprehensiveness and effectiveness of science instruction, it would
have encouraged the teaching of all scientific theories about the origins of human-
kind").
In Coleman v. Caddo Parish Sch. Board, No. 385,230 (1st Jud. Dist. Mar. 18,
1993), affd in part and amended in part, 635 So. 2d 1238 (La. Ct. App. 1994), the
court enjoined the use of a textbook and curriculum guide entitled "Sex Respect"
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In summary, students' first amendment right to receive
information guarantees that school curricula will not be used
to impose school officials' own political views or prejudices. In
addition, school curricula cannot be used as a mechanism to
remove from students' consideration all ideas that some par-
ents might find offensive. Likewise, the right to receive objec-
tive information protects students' first amendment right to
form and retain their own beliefs. This right also prevents
students from being misled by school curricula that present
incomplete and thus distorted information. These components
of the First Amendment's protections are critical for analyzing
curricular bans on certain forms of teaching.
III. THE PROPOSED FIRST AMENDMENT TEST FOR CURRICULUM
BANS
The case law discussed above reveals that first amend-
ment challenges to content-based curriculum restrictions will
not be analyzed under the strict scrutiny standard of re-
view."s School officials' legitimate concerns and curriculum
decisions compete with students' rights to receive and discuss
all kinds of information. Because of the special setting of the
school, regulations that limit curriculum content should be
subjected to a balancing test. Building on existing Supreme
Court case law, none of which has involved precisely this kind
of restriction, it is possible to create a six-factored balancing
analysis based upon first amendment principles.
Such a balancing test is analogous to the standard for
that contained medically inaccurate and misleading information. Although the
decision was based on a Louisiana statute that required factual information in
sex-education curricula, the opinion underscored the necessity of useful knowledge,
particularly in areas of the curriculum that affect personal life decisions. Id. at 15-
17. One passage referring to AIDS, for example, was struck down because the
court found that it reflected the "moral belief that AIDS affects those who have, in
the writers opinion, committed some immoral act .... It ignores that [HIVI is a
disease transmitted by a variety of circumstances, and suggests that a 'moral
landscape' rather than pathology explains the spread of this disease" Id. at 16.
Again, while the court struck down these passages because they "fail[ed] to comply
with the statute's mandate of disseminating factual pathological information," and
because the role of public schools is to provide students with access to useful
knowledge, mis-information that directly impedes this goal should be eliminated as
a constitutional matter. See id.
1. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
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evaluating first amendment speech claims by public employees,
another special setting where similar interests are at stake.
Courts reviewing public employees' first amendment claims
balance the interests of the state, as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of public services against employees' interests in
commenting upon matters of public concern in their capacity
as citizens.' This analysis considers the state employer's ad-
ministrative needs as well as the importance of the employee's
participation in public debate.' Courts should follow a simi-
lar model when evaluating curriculum restrictions.
In assessing a curriculum restriction, courts should bal-
ance schools' administrative and educational concerns with
students' constitutional rights to be informed and prepared for
their future roles in society. To guide this balancing process,
courts should consider the following six factors: (1) whether the
school officials were motivated by a desire to suppress a partic-
ular "dangerous" idea;8 6 (2) whether the topic or view being
restricted is part of an ongoing public controversy;'87 (3)
whether the school is presenting inaccurate or misleading
information to students;"s (4) whether restricting informa-
tion will have a substantial impact on students;'89 (5)
"' Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (holding unconstitu-
tional the termination of a public school teacher for submitting letter to the editor
of local paper critical of school board funding plan because it chilled informed
public debate). The public employee test clearly takes into consideration the impor-
tance of maintaining the "free and open debate vital to informed decision-making."
Id. at 571-72. It should be noted, however, that while public employment is essen-
tial to an employee's livelihood, non-public employment also is an option. Atten-
dance at public school, however, other than for the limited population that can
afford private education, remains compulsory. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (states may require all children of proper age to attend some
form of schooling).
"8 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
... See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871 (1982); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
..7 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510 (noting that "the action of the school authorities
appears to have been based upon an urgent wish to avoid the controversy [sur-
rounding] ... this Nation's part in the conflagration in Vietnam").
'1 See Edwards v. Aquillard, 482 U.S. 578, 588 (1987); Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97, 116 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring).
"8' See Hazelwood Sch. Dist., v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 275 (1988) (decision
to excise only two pages of school paper reasonable); Planned Parenthood v. Clark
County Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817, 830 (9th Cir. 1991) (school officials "could reason-
ably choose to have the family planning debate take place in the classroom rather
than in the advertising pages of its school-sponsored publications").
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whether a nexus exists between the regulation and a substan-
tial educational or operational goal;90 and (6) whether the
topic sought to be regulated is encompassed by the course of
study already offered by the school.'9' Essentially, schools
can impose values, so long as these values are consistent with,
and implemented in line with, the Constitution.
1. Did School Officials Intend to Suppress a Particular
Idea?
When evaluating curriculum restrictions, courts first
should determine school officials' motivation for curtailing ac-
cess to particular curricular content. Although often difficult to
establish, school authorities' attempts to distort the curricula
to favor certain views should be exceedingly difficult to justify
because such a policy contradicts fundamental first amend-
ment principles.'92 Indeed, students depend on a free and
open education system to learn to evaluate competing
views.
9 3
Courts must prohibit school Officials who commandeer the
curriculum in an effort to impose their political or social views
on students, particularly when they act to simply eliminate
conflicting perspectives.'94 Absent explicit evidence, courts
have determined motivation by considering whether the school
followed established procedures,' examining the atmosphere
surrounding the decision,196 and looking at the language of
'so See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
'* See Epperson, 393 U.S. at 116 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871 (1982) (decisions intended to deny
access to ideas with which school authorities disagree violate the Constitution).
" Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); see also MORRIS,
supra note 28, at 116 ("An indispensable function of the curriculum of the Ameri-
can public school is to . . . produc[e] a mentality in all students such that they
can . . . critically evaluate values and rationally choose their own.").
"' See, e.g., Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979);
Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978).
,' See, e.g., Pico, 457 U.S. at 866-67 (failure to read banned books); Scheck v.
Baileyville Sch. Comm., 530 F. Supp. 679, 691-92 (D. Me. 1982) (criticizing "utter
absence of procedural ground rules or minutes memorializing the Committee ra-
tionale").
" See Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1325 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding that
abrupt change in policy after unpopular groups requested access to school support-
ed inference that school intended to suppress unpopular the groups' views).
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the restriction itself."7 Where a school designates a particu-
lar perspective as the "correct" view, this exclusion of all other
views is likely to be found unconstitutional.19 Thus, this first
factor should weigh heavily in the balancing analysis.
Moreover, established first amendment case law teaches
that although community needs are a relevant consideration in
some school policies, a local majority's view should never be
imposed to exclude all minority views.'99 Because school
boards are popularly elected entities "they are likely to be
highly responsive to the demands of the majority that elected
them. The political process thus affords scant protection to the
community's ideological minorities."20 As a result, courts
should give particular scrutiny to claims by historically mis-
treated or unpopular minorities that their perspectives are
being suppressed by a local school board.20'
2. Is the Topic Being Restricted Part of an Ongoing Public
Controversy?
Another related consideration is whether the restricted
speech reflects an ongoing public controversy. Where the school
favors a particular side in an obvious societal debate, courts
should scrutinize the regulation especially rigorously. A gov-
ernmental entity that attempts to directly influence the out-
come of debate violates the First Amendment. Whether the
issue may actually be considered a debate, however, must be
measured on a national scale, not just by looking at the partic-
ular community involved.2 2 While community values are rel-
"7 See Sheck, 530 F. Supp. at 692 n.18 (ruling that evidence of intent to sup-
press ideas could be inferred from "the overbreadth of the ban itself').
"s See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511
(1969).
"' Stanley Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the "Pall of Orthodoxy": Val-
ue Training in the Public School, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 15, 70-71.
200 Although it may be argued that the local school boards are best able to re-
present the views of the community, "[tihe representative nature of school boards
militates in favor of, not against, imposing restrictions on curricular decisions . . .
[slince the preponderance . . . of school boards are elected." Nat Stern, Challeng-
ing Ideological Exclusion of Curriculum Material: Rights of Students and Parents,
14 HARV. CA.-CJL. L. REV. 485, 486 (1979).
20' See, e.g., Loewen v. Turnipseed, 488 F. Supp. 1138, 1154 (N.D. Miss. 1980)
(finding textbook selection committee's prior history of racially motivated decisions
relevant).
202 Ingber, supra note 199, at 70-71 ("Judgments of a local elite that conflict
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evant, they cannot override the Constitution. Indeed, if there
was a need for only local consensus, doctrines such as evolu-
tionary theory might never have been discussed in certain
areas of the country.
203
To determine whether the regulated speech is part of a
broader political debate, courts might craft a standard similar
to the Federal Communications Commission's "fairness doc-
trine."24 The fairness doctrine requires broadcasters to pres-
ent alternative points of view once a "controversial issue of
public importance" is discussed on the air. When analyzing
what constitutes an important "controversial issue," courts
consider "the degree of attention paid to [the] issue by govern-
ment officials, [other] leaders, and the media," as well as the
importance of the issue to the public.05 Under such a test,
most issues relating to current social or political debates would
fal within the scope of a "controversial issue."2 7 Students
must be exposed to these controversial issues as they will con-
with national perspectives are no more likely to receive judicial deference simply
because the elite is a school board using the rhetoric of 'educational suitability.").
First amendment values, with the exception of obscenity standards, are always
measured on a national scale. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1973) (holding
that "[u]nder a national Constitution, fundamental First Amendment limitations on
the power of the states do not vary from community to community").
203 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 112 (1968) (finding clear legislative and
popular support for statute proscribing evolutionary theory in schools).
"" Kamenshine, supra note 87, at 1113 (suggesting use of this doctrine for
invoking his proposed "implied establishment clause" requiring government neu-
trality in government speech settings); see also Stephen Gottlieb, In the Name of
Patriotism: The Constitutionality of "Bending" History in Public Secondary Schools,
62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 497 (1987) (arguing for application of a fairness test based on
the FCC's fairness doctrine to history textbook selection in public schools). Al-
though the FCC discontinued enforcement of this doctrine in 1987, it continues to
provide guidance for first amendment thought. See id. at 500 n.17.
... Kamenshine, supra note 87, at 1113; see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding constitutionality of the fairness doctrine). For
the application of a similar test in the school setting see Bonner-Lyons v. School
Comm., 480 F.2d 442, 442-43 (1st Cir. 1973) (enjoining school officials from distrib-
uting leaflets opposing involuntary bussing to achieve racially integrated schools
"unless fair and reasonabl[y] timely opportunities] ... were afforded to those
with differing views" to use the same channels).
26 Kamenshine, supra note 87, at 1113-14.
... Kamenshine, supra note 87, at 1113-14. In Red Lion Broadcasting, the Su-
preme Court acknowledged that this is a broad definition but, because the goal of
the fairness doctrine is to increase speech and foster public debate for the listen-




tinue to grapple with such issues in their adult lives.
3. Is the Information Presented to Students Inaccurate or
Misleading?
Courts also should consider whether the curriculum re-
striction results in erroneous or misleading information being
presented to students."8 Misinformation fails to further edu-
cational goals and contravenes schools' purpose. 9 Outside
the context of schools, the First Amendment generally prohib-
its the state from "correcting" ideas, preferring that false no-
tions be remedied in the free marketplace of ideas.210 In the
case of a state-run, compulsory school, however, there is little
opportunity to "correct" false information emanating from
school curricula.21 Thus, misinformation directly undermines
students' ability to think clearly about policy issues and gov-
ernment. Public schools should not be allowed to use their
discretionary power to evade constitutional principles.
4. Does the Restriction Directly Harm Students?
Whether a speech restriction has some concrete, harmful
impact on students' lives also should be part of analyzing its
"' See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1969).
... Yudof, supra note 87, at 864.
"' See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (striking
down strict liability standard for libel laws as applied to public figures to preserve
the free marketplace of ideas); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) ("the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market"); see also John S. Mill, On Liber-
ty (1859), reprinted in MORRIS, supra note 28, at 117-19 (describing concept of
marketplace of ideas).
211 Yudof, supra note 87, at 875 ("public schools are a communication theorist's
dream: the audience is captive and immature, the messages are labeled as educa-
tional; . . . the audience may hold the adult communicator in high esteem; and a
system of rewards and punishments is available to reinforce the messages"). This
is not to say that the "marketplace of ideas" should not exist in the curriculum,
but rather that courts should recognize that where teachers are required to pro-
mulgate a specific view, a child does not have equal resources to combat that
perspective. Id. at 900-01 (implying that in the context of schools, the traditional
notion of information correcting itself in the marketplace of ideas is inapplicable);
see also Gottlieb, supra note 204, at 550-51 ("[w~hen government captures and mo-
nopolizes an audience, it has a correlative obligation to present material in a way
that furthers rather than hampers the discussion of public issues").
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constitutionality. While it is never beneficial to restrict infor-
mation in the public schools, omission of facts regarding trivial
topics has a minimal impact on students. In contrast, informa-
tion concerning certain topics has a direct influence on
students' lives and decisions. The balance and accuracy of this
relevant information is particularly important where a defined
group of students would be harmed by its omission or biased.
slant.
For instance, students not exposed to information regard-
ing family planning will be directly affected in making life-
altering decisions, such as how to handle an unwanted preg-
nancy.212 Moreover, this impact is not merely speculative be-
cause all schools (at least after certain grade levels) have sexu-
ally active students who need such information.213 When sex-
ually active students lack access to this knowledge they may
experience tangible harms such as misunderstanding medical
options or experiencing personal trauma. Thus, schools will
have difficulty justifying curriculum decisions that curtail or
eliminate information to the detriment of a significant group of
students. This type of concrete harm elevates students' rights
beyond their basic freedom of belief and expression and enti-
tles them to an even greater level of protection against govern-
ment-imposed injury.
5. Is There a Nexus Between the Restriction and a
Substantial Goal of the School?
A related concern that courts should evaluate is whether
schools have proven a nexus between the educational interest
they assert and the curricula.214 In addition to a strong corre-
212 Janet Benshoof, The Chastity Act: Government Manipulation of Abortion In-
formation and the First Amendment, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1916, 1925-26 (1988)
("[d]ue to the scarcity of health care services for adolescents and the necessity to
decide quicdly whether to have an abortion, pregnant teenagers do not shop
around for counseling on abortion services" and thus the information they do re-
ceive becomes very important).
2" See Centers for Disease Control, Guidelines for Effective School Health Edu-
cation to Prevent the Spread of AIDS, 37 MMWR 12 (1988) (finding 70% of high
school students sexually active).
214 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988) (concluding
that speech restrictions on school sponsored speech must be reasonably related to
the asserted educational interests offered by the school); Steirer ex rel. Steirer v.
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lation between the schools' asserted objective and the curtail-
ment of the curricula, schools should be required to show that
a significant educational interest is at stake. Carefully drafted
restrictions on curricula content that assure lessons are appro-
priate for students' maturity level, for example, are more likely
to be constitutional than broad regulations that ban entire con-
cepts from the school.215 Moreover, courts should weigh how
much a particular regulation intrudes into classroom teaching.
As one commentator has stated: "[tihe greater the ability of the
school system to control what goes on in every classroom, the
greater the danger of its promulgating a uniform message to
its captive listeners."21
Here, it also is important for courts to examine the rela-
tionship of the regulating body to the classroom. While local
school boards generally are given broad power to define curric-
ula to meet the individual community's educational needs,
statewide regulations may demand specific classroom practices
to "increase [the state's] capacity to indoctrinate a single ideo-
logical point of view."1 Such motivations are less likely to
create curricula that meet valid educational needs.
6. Is the Topic Sought to Be Restricted Encompassed By
Subjects Taught in the School?
Finally, courts should consider to what extent a school's
curriculum already encompasses the topic sought to be regulat-
ed."' Obviously, because of time and other practical limita-
Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d 989, 994 (3d Cir.) (providing educational
justification does not make school program "ipso facto constitutional"), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 85 (1993); Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1324 (11th Cir. 1989)
(ruling that school must show that educational goals are furthered by restricting
speech).
21 See Sheck v. Baileyville Sch. Comm., 530 F. Supp. 679, 691 (D. Me. 1982)
("Although a rational demonstration that harm might result to some students may
be possible in these circumstances, . . . it is not an acceptable assumption that all
students, regardless of their age or maturity, might be harmed by exposure to
such language."); cf. Bethel v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (maintaining order
by punishing vulgar speech allowed); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (banning one idea from school invalid).
21 Yudof, supra note 87, at 876 (discussing need for teachers to retain some
degree of autonomy over what is taught in the classroom to maintain pluralism).
217 Yudof, supra note 87, at 876-77.
21 "It is a familiar constitutional principle that a state, though having acted
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tions, public school curricula cannot cover every topic. For
those subjects that schools do address, however, certain view-
points and information are vital to providing a basic and bal-
anced understanding of the topics.219 Requirements discussed
above-such as the school officials' ability to demonstrate a
rational basis for restricting information-should be more
difficult to meet if the subject already is included in the curric-
ulum. Thus, while students have no protected interest in hear-
ing information that is totally detached from the school's cur-
riculum, it will be difficult for schools to justify limiting rele-
vant material in those subjects they do address.
In evaluating curriculum restrictions, courts therefore
should determine the extent of students' interests in receiving
the prohibited information and should weigh this against the
factors that may favor the schools' interests. Again, the school's
motivation for the restriction should weigh especially heavily
in the balance because the state should not be allowed simply
to suppress a disfavored viewpoint. Other factors that tend to
favor the student rather than the school are where restrictions
relate to a matter of significant public controversy, result in
inaccurate or misleading information, risk harming students,
serve no legitimate educational goals, or relate to topics al-
ready covered by the curriculum.
IV. A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF ANTI-GAY CuRIcuLAR
RESTRICTIONS UNDER THE PROPOSED BALANCING TEST
As discussed above, restrictions on the acceptance of homo-
sexuality within public schools fit into three categories. To
date, the types of statutes and regulations enacted that con-
strict discussion of homosexuality within public schools' curric-
when not compelled, may consequentially create a constitutionally protected inter-
est." Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 711-12 (D.
Mass. 1978) (holding relevancy of poem to students' experiences favored its inclu-
sion in the literature curriculum); see also Zykan v. Board of Educ., 631 F.2d
1300, 1306 (7th Cir. 1980) (ruling schools cannot prohibit "the mention of certain
relevant topics in the classroom because that "impair[s] permanently the students'
ability to investigate matters that arise in the natural course of intellectual inqui-
ry"); Minarcini v. Strongsville City Sch. Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 581-82 (6th Cir. 1976)
(considering relevancy of censored material).
"' See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (removing prevailing
scientific view from consideration of human development was impermissible).
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ula include: restrictions that ban the topic of homosexuality;
restrictions that ban the view that homosexuality is acceptable;
and restrictions that require teachers to emphasize the view
that homosexuality is unacceptable. The constitutional balanc-
ing test described above would find each of these restrictions
unconstitutional.
The first category of restriction totally bans the topic of
homosexuality within the school curriculum. An example of
this type of regulation is a New York City School District reso-
lution that "mandate[s] that any reference to... homosexuali-
ty... be eliminated from [the] curriculum."" ° Similarly, a
statute in South Carolina precludes all discussion of "homosex-
ual relationships." 1 These broad regulations chill discussion
on any topic that might relate to or "make reference to" homo-
sexuality. Thus, teachers in these jurisdictions might even
abstain from topics relating to sexual identity or family compo-
sition to avoid the students raising questions the teacher must
refuse to answer.
The second type of regulation prohibits the viewpoint that
homosexuality is acceptable. The Utah State Board of Educa-
tion, for example, excludes from its textbooks the "acceptance
of homosexuality as a desirable or healthy sexual adjustment
or lifestyle."2" Like the New York City topic ban, the Utah
textbook guidelines apply to all areas of the curricula. Similar-
ly, an Arizona statute prohibits any statement in its AIDS-
education curriculum that might be construed as condoning
homosexuality. The statute prohibits any course of instruction
in AIDS education that "(1) promotes a homosexual lifestyle;
(2) portrays homosexuality as a positive alternative lifestyle;
[or] (3) suggests that some methods of sex are safe methods of
homosexual sex."2 This statute requires schools to avoid any
positive references to gay men and lesbians and prohibits any
mention of methods of safer sex practices that might be impor-
tant for gay students. The statute even forbids neutral mention
that such practices exist because a neutral statement could be
11 Quinn Letter, supra note 16 (parental permission form for 1991-92 school
year); see also Myers, supra note 16, at Bi; Willen, supra note 16, at 3.
2' S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-32-30(A)(5) (Law. Co-op. 1991). The law does provide
for one exception-in instruction on sexually transmitted diseases.
1 Mecham Memorandum, supra note 15.
- ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-716 (Supp. 1992).
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construed as "promoting" homosexual sex.
The final category of restrictions, those requiring that ho-
mosexuality be emphasized as an unacceptable lifestyle, typi-
cally focus on sex-education programs. Statutes in Alabama
and Texas, for example, require that sex education emphasize,
"in a factual manner and from a public health perspective, that
homosexuality is not a lifestyle acceptable to the general public
and that homosexual conduct is a criminal offense under the
[state penal code]." 4 Moreover, the Alabama and Texas laws
seem to require constant references to popular opinion and the
state's criminal law in the event of any discussion. A regula-
tion in Prince William County, Virginia, likewise requires
teachers to emphasize the viewpoint that homosexuality is
unacceptable.' To obey these curriculum restrictions, teach-
ers in these school systems either must avoid any positive or
neutral reference to homosexuality, or constantly must re-focus
discussions to stress negative views.
A first amendment challenge to these statutes and regu-
lations, based on students' right to receive information, results
in the conclusion that all three types of restrictions are uncon-
stitutional. Each factor of the appropriate balancing test favors
students' right to information over schools' interests. Although
a range of views exist regarding the social acceptance of homo-
sexuality, all of the curriculum restrictions and statutes re-
quire schools to enforce only one side of this controversy. Both
the text of the restrictions themselves, as well as the social
controversy surrounding their adoption, demonstrate that
schools are enforcing a preferred view and by doing so are
shielding students from a full understanding of the controversy
surrounding sexual orientation. 6
22 ALA. CODE § 16-40A-2 (Supp. 1992); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §
15-716 (West 1992).
" Maria E. Odum, Topic of Homosexuality Shows Diversity in Sex Education,
WASH. PoST, Dec. 27, 1992, at B1 (reporting that Prince William County's curricu-
lum restriction requires that homosexuality "not be taught as an acceptable life-
style as homosexual acts are a violation of state law").
"6 See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text. The religious right has been
forthright about their mission to remove positive references to homosexuality from
school curricula as part of their larger political campaign. See Alan Edwards, Gay
Lifestyle Won't Be Called "Healthy", DESERET NEWS, June 16, 1993, at B1;
Langland, supra note 12, at B4 (reporting Octorara School District in Pennsylvania
voting on a proposal that "reflects complaints . . . made by many conservative
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While such "viewpoint ban"227 restrictions are the most
obvious viewpoint discrimination (because they expressly pro-
scribe any positive viewpoint of homosexuality) the other two
categories of regulations also constitute viewpoint bans. The
regulations that simply ban the topic of homosexuality' at
first blush appear to be of the more permissible, subject-matter
variety. Banning "any reference to homosexuality" in the con-
text of present school curricula in fact bans a viewpoint, how-
ever. 9 Forbidding the mention of homosexuality restricts
any discussion involving sexual identity, family composition,
and sexual behavior. Such a ban does not allow a teacher to
express that homosexuality is wrong or immoral any more
than it allows a teacher to encourage respect of gay people.
This mandated invisibility, however, reinforces the societal
oppression and anti-gay attitudes that already are prevalent
and experienced by gay youth in the schools despite such a
"neutral" curriculum." Because heterosexuality undoubtedly
will be discussed, and sanctioned, this inescapably enforces the
viewpoint that being gay is wrong."m
Similarly, the "viewpoint emphasis" restrictions" func-
tion as viewpoint prohibitions. The text of the statutes and
regulations require teachers to "emphasize" the view that ho-
mosexuality generally is considered unhealthy and unaccept-
able." Because teachers cannot gauge the precise "empha-
Christians, particularly Christians for Excellence in Education"); Tracey McCartney,
MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, July 14, 1992, at 19 (noting that the Utah and the
Alabama anti-gay curriculum restrictions were passed with heavy lobbying by the
conservative Eagle Forum); Smolowe, supra note 14, at 34.
"f See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text; see also Idaho Att'y Gen.
Opinion 19, No. 93-11, at 19 (Nov. 3, 1993) (finding Idaho's proposed viewpoint-
ban initiative unconstitutional in part because evidence showed that the school
intended to suppress a "viewpoint with which the state disagrees."). The opinion
provides the example that, although "a teacher [could] raise, in a high school civ-
ics class, gays in the military as a topic for discussion . . . [the initiative would]
prohibit[ ] one viewpoint on this topic from being addressed"). Id.
' See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
=' Here, the curriculum restrictions function like the unconstitutional anti-evolu-
tion statute in Epperson because they deny access to "an entire system of...
human thought." See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
230 See discussion supra at part I3.
231 See Gershick, supra note 55, at 56 (stating that invisibility of homosexuality
makes gay students feel inferior).
2 See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
2" See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-40A-2 (Supp. 1992) (requiring "emphasis .. . from
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sis" of their discussion if both positive and negative views are
mentioned, most teachers will avoid making any statement
condoning homosexuality. s4 Even teachers who allow a de-
gree of open discussion ultimately are forced to maintain a
negative emphasis at the expense of a candid discussion."
The severe chilling effect of these restrictions effectively elimi-
nates any positive view of homosexuality.
These types of statutes all attempt to convince students
that homosexuality is wrong. These statutes employ the most
efficient, albeit unconstitutional means to achieve their goal:
restricting classroom discussion and textbooks to reflect a
singular, negative view. The statutes shortcut the educational
process by restricting students' consideration of homosexuality
to the states' preferred view, thus unconstitutionally interfer-
ing with the formation of belief and opinion on a matter of
public controversy.
The second factor, that the restricted speech is related to
an ongoing public debate, clearly is germane to an assessment
of such statutes. The social position of gay men and lesbians is
currently a matter of national social and political debate. 6
As gay and lesbian people have heightened the visibility of
their issues over the past decades, the result has been both in-
creased acceptance as well as continued violence and discrimi-
nation. 7 Although gay men and lesbians have organized po-
a public health perspective, that homosexuality is not a lifestyle acceptable to the
general public").
"' Knowledge v. Board of Educ., Decision by the Commissioner of Education 8
(Feb. 8, 1993) (striking down resolution that required emphasizing abstinence in
all AIDS-education classes as ineffective, "stop-watch" education), affd, Board of
Educ. v. Sobol, 161 Misc. 2d 393, 613 N.Y.S.2d 792 (Sup. Ct. Albany County
1993).
" The statutes function like the equal time statute struck down in Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 582 (1987) (mandating that equal time be given to cre-
ationism where evolution was taught compelled teachers to "discredit evolution by
counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the teaching of creationism").
" This is perhaps most obviously exemplified by the differences between the
Democratic and Republican presidential platforms in 1992. Mary Jordan, Voters
Decry GOP "Gay Bashing," WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1992, at A27 (noting Republican
National Convention espoused "no special rights" for gay men and lesbians while
the Democratic party "expressed unequivocal support for the protection of gays'
civil rights").
"7 See, e.g., Peter Applebome, Military People Split Over Ban on Homosexuals,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 28, 1993, at A16 (controversy over whether gay men and lesbians
should be able to serve openly in the military reveals spectrum of attitudes to-
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litically and fought for increased legal protections, the religious
right and other groups continue to pass anti-gay initia-
tives.' Despite competing views of the acceptability of homo-
sexuality, all of the anti-gay education restrictions have opted
to enforce a negative view of homosexuality. 9
Furthermore, all of the anti-gay education statutes man-
date inaccurate or distorted information to be disseminated in
the classroom. First, the topic bans omit an entire field of
knowledge that is relevant to many areas addressed by the
school.24 This lack of information misleads students as to the
very existence of gay people. In addition, the Arizona statute
distorts the discussion of many issues by eliminating any posi-
tive view of homosexuality and also requiring teachers to inac-
curately espouse that all methods of homosexual sex create a
risk of HIV transmission. 1 This information is both false
and misleading. Just as with heterosexual sex, many forms of
homosexual sex are risk-free, while other sexual conduct is
considered safe when precautions are taken.242 The effect of
this type of restriction is that, even if a gay student is fortu-
nate enough to receive information from an outside source
regarding how to practice safe sex, having been taught in
school that no method is safe for her or him, the student may
ward homosexuality in society); John Leland, Homophobia, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 14,
1994, at 42, 42 ("gays are finding that increased visibility is a double-edged sword.
They have greater political clout and social acceptance, but their newfound confi-
dence has energized the far right, and anti-gay harassment and violence have
doubled in the last few years."); School District Allows Gay Students To Meet, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 1994, at 8 (discussing a California high school's decision to allow a
gay student group to meet on its premises despite community controversy).
"8 See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text; see also Steven A. Holmes, Gay
Rights Advocates Brace for Ballot Fights, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1994, at A17 (not-
ing that "a record number of state ballot initiatives ... that would forbid laws
specifically protecting homosexuals from discrimination" are planned); Note, supra
note 8, at 1905 ("rallying against the establishment of 'special rights,' some right-
wing, fimdamentalist Christian groups have embarked on extensive campaigns to
curtail the civil rights of lesbians and gay men").
"' See Idaho At'y Gen. Opinion, supra note 227, at 19 (noting that the pro-
posed viewpoint ban would be unconstitutional because the state is "officially dic-
tating the outcome" of discussions ranging from homosexuals in the military to
AIDS).
24. See infra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
241 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-716 (Supp. 1992) (no instruction may suggest
"that some methods of sex are safe methods of homosexual sex").
242 See Gerald H. Friedland & Robert S. Klein, Transmission of the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1125, 1128-30 (1987).
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either disregard the accurate information or unnecessarily be
worried about transmission where it is unfounded.243
In addition, statutes like those in Alabama and Texas that
require teachers to emphasize the idea that "homosexual con-
duct" is illegal are erroneous and misleading. By failing to
define "homosexual conduct," the statutes conflate homosexual-
ity with sodomy. Sodomy may be illegal under Alabama and
Texas state law, but being gay is not, nor is much of the activi-
ty that could be termed "homosexual conduct." 4 Moreover,
the information required to be taught by these statutes mis-
leads students by portraying certain sexual behavior between
persons of the same gender as illegal but failing to mention
that many states also outlaw the same conduct between per-
sons of opposite genders. For example, although Texas' sodomy
law only applies to same-sex couples, Alabama prohibits all
sodomy regardless of the gender or sexual orientation of those
engaged in the act.245 Thus, the statute requires instructors
24 The Arizona statute hinders the already difficult task of getting youth to
practice safer sex. See generally Centers for Disease Control, supra note 213, at 12
(study of 860 teenagers aged 16-19 revealed that while 70% were sexually active,
only 15% changed their behavior out of concern of contracting HIV and, of that
15%, only 20% selected effective preventive methods).
21 ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-65(a)(3), 13A-6-60 (1982 & Supp. 1993) (oral and anal
sex illegal); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (West 1991) (oral and anal sex be-
tween persons of the same gender illegal). But see Patricia Cain, Litigating for
Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REV. 1551, 1564 (1993) (quot-
ing Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1976)) ("'It
has never been illegal to be gay'"); id. at 1564 n.84 ("While Virginia law pro-
scribes the practice of certain forms of homosexuality . .. Virginia law does not
make it a crime to be a homosexual. Indeed, a statute criminalizing status and
prescribing punishment therefore would be invalid.").
Nonetheless, the homosexual status/conduct distinction is confused in many
areas of the law. See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 531, 543-46 (1992) (discussing some courts' perception of sodomy as
"the totality of homosexuality" in evaluating equal protection claims by gay and
lesbian plaintiffs). By conflating sodomy with gay and lesbian identity, states use
sodomy laws less to prosecute consenting adults for sexual behavior than to lend
ideological legitimacy to homophobic attitudes. See Kendall Thomas, Beyond the
Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1435, 1469-92 (1992) (arguing that
homosexual sodomy statutes "violate the right to be free from state-legitimated
violence at the hands of private and public actors"). Laws singling out same-sex
sodomy for negative reinforcement in the classroom are consistent with this para-
digm.
246 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(3) (consensual sodomy statute is gender neutral); see
also Idaho Att'y Gen. Opinion, supra note 227, at 5 n.2 (noting that both homo-
sexual and heterosexual sodomy is a crime in Idaho).
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to falsely give the impression that sodomy laws are applicable
only to sexual behavior among persons of the same gender.
By undertaking to teach students about sex education and
AIDS, schools accept an obligation to provide accurate and
comprehensive information.246 Instead, the anti-gay restric-
tions instill misleading views and waste an opportunity to
combat anti-gay stereotypes that are prevalent among
teens.247 Such practices have a tangible impact on the gay-
student population in these schools. These teachings harm all
students by perpetuating intolerance and hostility and, ulti-
mately, condoning violence. 4 The misinformation mandated
by the statutes also hurts students who rely on the information
presented in AIDS-education and sex-education classes to
make important personal and often potentially life-threatening
decisions." In addition, the statutes that impose such mis-
leading views imply to children that it is acceptable to dislike
In addition, teaching that homosexuality is unhealthy based on "a public
health perspective," as required by the Alabama and Texas statutes, is similarly
unsound. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 163.002(8). The vast ma-
jority of public health literature does not support defining homosexuality as "un-
healthy." See generally Herek, supra note 40 (reviewing public health literature
regarding homosexuality).
" Leslie -M. Kantor, Scared Chaste?: Fear-Based Educational Curricula, 21
SEICUS REP. 1 (Dec. 1992/Jan. 1993) (describing how fear-based sexuality educa-
tion curricula "are in direct opposition to the goals of comprehensive sexuality
education curricula, which seek to assist young people in developing a healthy
understanding about their sexuality so that they can make responsible decisions
throughout their lives").
247 In New York City in 1992, 70% of the anti-gay/lesbian bias crimes were
committed by persons 25 years of age or younger. NEW YORK CITY GAY & LESBIAN
ANTI-VIOLENCE PROJECT, supra note 67, at 6-7 (observing that "[t]he age of the
perpetrators of anti-gay/lesbian crimes is significantly lower than persons arrested
for other kinds of crime in New York City").
28 See Thomas, supra note 244, at 1490-91 ("[g]overnment inaction toward inci-
dents of homophobic violence effectively [means that] ... the private citizens who
commit acts of... violence against gays and lesbians can be said to do so under
color, or more precisely, under cover of law").
"' Adolescents' decisions regarding sexuality have been recognized as important
and worthy of protection. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
74-75 (1976) ("Minors . . . are protected by the Constitution and possess constitu-
tional rights."); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977) (same).
In addition, courts have upheld AIDS-education curricula against parental chal-
lenges because such information serves the compelling state interest in preserving
the health of the community. See, e.g., Ware v. Valley Stream High Sch. Dist., 150
A.D.2d 14, 21, 545 N.Y.S.2d 316, 321 (2d. Dep't 1989) (holding "the very real and
dangerous health crisis which this curriculum was designed to address compels its
dissemination to all students").
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gay people and even to act violently against them.
Furthermore, no reasonable nexus exists between the anti-
gay curriculum restrictions and any legitimate educational
goal. The restrictions apply to all grades and age levels and
therefore fail to ensure that discussions are age-appropri-
ate.' ° Thus, while "there is clearly no constitutional problem
with [a] requirement that any discussion of homosexuality
within public schools be 'age-appropriate,"' the wording of
these statutes goes well beyond this requirement."1 While
some statutes apply to the entire curriculum, others apply only
to sex- or AIDS-education classes-the areas in which the for-
bidden information is most relevantY2 In addition, while
particular local school boards may be assumed to understand
the values and educational needs of their communities, when a
state legislature imposes its viewpoint this suggests that the
statutes are simply an attempt to indoctrinate, rather than to
react to a specific educational needy 3 Thus, the breadth of
the language in these statutes further undermines any argu-
ment that they serve legitimate goals.
Finally, the information banned by the statutes is encom-
passed by most school curricula since AIDS- and sex-education
programs discuss such topics. Even though public schools
21 See supra notes 220-25 and accompanying text.
25 Idaho Att'y Cen. Opinion, supra note 227, at 18-19; see also Sheck v.
Baileyville Sch. Comm., 530 F. Supp. 679, 692 (D. Me. 1982) (holding book ban
unconstitutional because applies to "mature as well as immature students, regard-
less of their age or sophistication").
"' The Texas and Alabama emphasis statutes specifically apply to "course mate-
rials and instruction relating to sexual education or sexually transmitted diseases,"
see supra note 226, while the Arizona viewpoint ban applies to "instruction on
acquired immune deficiency syndrome." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1515-716. Other
statutes and regulations cover the entire curricula. For example, New York City
School District 24 has removed "any reference to . . . homosexuality . . . from the
curriculum." Quinn Letter, supra note 16 (parental permission form for the 1991-
92 school year).
' See Yudof, supra note 87, at 876-77. Furthermore, the nexus between the
schools purported interest and the need to ban speech is questionable based on
the broad-sweeping nature of the restrictions. The Court in Pico, for example,
found it necessary to protect students from local authorities' attempts to limit the
spectrum of knowledge within a voluntarily utilized library. Board of Educ. v. Pico,
457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982). These anti-gay education statutes and regulations, in
contrast, are enforced against all students, often state-wide, as part of the manda-
tory curriculum. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-40A-2 (mandating state-wide restriction




might not discuss homosexuality directly, they do undertake
sex education, family composition and AIDS education. There-
fore, schools may not claim neutrality, or irrelevance, nor disal-
low one prominent view within the public debate.
CONCLUSION
Under the proposed balancing test drawn from First
Amendment precedent, prohibitions that forbid or negatively
slant teaching about homosexuality should be found unconsti-
tutional. All three types of statutes not only restrict teachers
from discussing the full range of issues and opinions regarding
homosexuality, but prohibit even a limited, balanced discussion
of clearly relevant material. Instead, the restrictions enforce a
single, state-selected point of view that distorts and restricts
students' understanding of important health and social is-
sues. 4 In addition to stifling discussion, the restrictions af-
firmatively harm students by presenting inaccurate and mis-
leading information regarding issues crucial to adolescents'
well-being (such as sexual identity and the transmission of the
AIDS virus). This misinformation harms the entire student
population by perpetuating ignorance and anti-gay stereotypes
already prevalent among youth. Thus, any operational or edu-
cational interest asserted by schools in these cases is out-
weighed by students' interests. Indeed, these statutes contra-
vene schools' basic educational functions-in particular, the
goal of enabling all youth to acquire the knowledge and skills
necessary to participate as full, equal and informed members
of society.
Although courts have yet to directly address first
amendment challenges to curricular restrictions based on
students' right to receive information, a balancing test would
provide the proper standard of analysis. The factors that courts
should use to balance the interests at stake in challenges to
"' Although none of the restrictions enacted to date specify the sanction if vio-
lated, teachers can be disciplined or fired for failing to follow established curric-
ulum guidelines. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 113-14 (1968)
(Black, J., concurring); Mercer v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 379 F. Supp. 580,
585 (EM. Mich.) (holding "[tihere is nothing in the First Amendment that gives a
person employed to teach the constitutional right to teach beyond the scope of the
established curriculum"), affd men., 419 U.S. 1081 (1974).
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curriculum restrictions appropriately are based on existing
case law. Anti-gay curriculum restrictions should be declared
unconstitutional because they far exceed schools' permissible
authority to establish the curriculum content and severely
impede all students' need for information regarding homosexu-
ality. If schools are unwilling to affirmatively address the par-
ticular educational needs of gay youth and to teach respect for
difference, at a minimum they must avoid affirnatively mis-
leading students by way of viewpoint-biased programs.
Nancy Tenney

